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PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE REGULATION OF
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS

Matthew Steilen *

ABSTRACT

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated convictions of several Amish parents for removing
their children from school in violation of state mandatory
attendance laws. In reaching its decision, the Court argued
that protecting the Amish parents' decisions fit into a longstanding American tradition of giving parents control over the
upbringing of their children. Yet the Supreme Court
mischaracterized the history of parental rights and state
interests in education. Contemporary historical research shows
that parents have long ceded a large measure of control to the
state in the education of their children. Still, very little has
been written about this scholarship in legal journals. This
article attempts to remedy this deficiency. It isolates and
explores three key periods in the development of stateadministered public schools, paying special attention to early
public funding of religious schools, the Protestant character of
the common schools, and Catholic resistance to the use of the
King James Bible in common schools. In so doing, this article
argues for a "republican" interpretation of early educational
practices. Drawing on that interpretation, the article joins a
debate between Noah Feldman, Martha Nussbaum, and others
about the nature of American religious liberties, and argues
that their views are not able to fully acknowledge the history of
Protestant evangelizing in public schools.
* La w clerk to the Honorable Kermit V. Lipez. Ph.D. 2005, Northwestern. J.D . 2008,
Stanford. This essay was prepared for the Stanford Legal Studies Workshop , 20072008. I a m grateful to members of the workshop for their comments, a nd to Larry
Kra mer, J oe Bankman, and Rob Reich for their guidance. Finally, th a nk you to Jeff
Peterson, Cara Xidis, Chad Olsen , Cristi Barnes, Alisi Langi, J anice Smith and
McKenn a Woodger of the BYU Education and Law Journal for their excellent editorial
work.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Legal Use of Educational History

In State v. Whis ner, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the
case of twelve parents indicted by a grand jury for violations of
a state education law that required parents to send their
children to schools that conformed to "minimum standards"
established by the State Board of Education.' The parents had
enrolled their children in Tabernacle Christian School, a "Bible
oriented" school that employed the Accelerated Christian
Education program, or "A.C.E." In the A.C.E. curriculum,
students work on their own through a series of workbooks. 2
The school principal, Reverend Levi Whisner, headed the
Tabernacle Christian Church, a church "not tied to any
r eligious system," but based on the idea that one could be "born
again" into "a life separate from sin." 3 Tabernacle aimed to
impart these beliefs to the parish children.
At trial, the parents testified that they sent their children
to Tabernacle because it was the only school in the area that
provided a "sound education in an atmosphere . . . compatible
with . . . Christian beliefs."4 In contrast, the parents said local
public schools had suffered a "moral breakdown," and they
could not in good conscience send their children there. 5 One
mother testified that sending her children to public school
would be failing her duty to provide her children with the ''best
education possible." 6 At the conclusion of trial, the parents
moved for acquittal, arguing that Ohio's compulsory
attenda nce statute, as applied to them, violated their right and
their children's right to the free exercise of religion under the
First Amendment.7 The trial court denied the motion. The
parents were convicted and the conviction was upheld on
appeal.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. It held that Ohio's
compulsory attenda nce law substantially burdened the
1. State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 753, 764 (1976).
2. ld. at 752, 755- 56.
3. ld. at 754- 55.
4. ld. at 756.
5. l d.
6. ld.
7. Id. at 757- 58.
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defendants' religious practices, implicating the Free Exercise
Clause under the rule of Wisconsin v. Yoder. 8 The court's focus
was on the substance of the "minimum standards"
requirement. Among other things, the standards required Ohio
schools to obtain state-issued charters, to submit to inspection
before a charter was issued, to allocate the entire instructional
time to various secular subjects, and to conform all school
activities to policies adopted by the board of education. 9 In
addition to the standards, Ohio law included a section entitled
"Interpretative and Explanatory Information," which contained
principles to guide school administrators in conforming to the
minimum standards. 10 These provisions specified, for example,
that "common problems are solved through the consensus of
thinking and action of individuals in the group;" that
"[o]rganized group life of all types must act in accordance with
established rules of social relationships and a system of social
controls;" and that a child's health is the "single greatest factor
in the development of a well rounded personality." 11
While the Ohio Supreme Court criticized several of the
minimum standards and interpretative principles, it focused its
attention on the requirement that Ohio schools conform all of
their activities to school board policies. 12 According to the
court, it would be impossible for a religiously neutral school
board to regulate all the activities of Tabernacle, since those
would necessarily include religious activities. A board
regulating all school activities would be compelled to take
positions that favored some religious practices and disfavored
others. 13 Furthermore, the court held that the minimum
standards were so extensive that requiring Tabernacle to
comply with all of them would "eradicate the distinction
between public and non-public education, and thereby deprive
these appellants of their traditional interest as parents to
direct the upbringing and education of their children." 14 In
these ways, the regulations imposed an undue burden on the

8. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 764.
9. Id. at 762 (citing EDb- 401-02 (1976)).
10. Id. at 750, 752- 53.
11. ld. at 763 (quoting EDb-401- 03(b) (1976)).
12. Id. at 765-66.
13. Id. at 766. As the court hints, this result could also be analyzed as a violation
of the Establishment Clause requirem ent of neutrality, or no excessive entanglement.
14. Whisn er, 351 N.E.2d at 768.
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parents' ability to exercise their genuinely held religious
beliefs. Under Yoder and other cases, only a compelling state
interest could justify such an infringement. The court found no
such compelling interest underlying the minimum standards.
The burden imposed by the law was so severe, the court said, it
was "difficult to imagine" what state interest could possibly
suffice. 15 The court concluded that the state could not infringe
upon the parents' educational rights through the use of the
minimum standards.
The r ea soning of the Ohio Supreme Court in Whisner was
by no means unusual. 16 In large part, the court followed the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, which has long
recognized the right of parents to control the education of their
children. In 1923, the Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska, struck down
a state statute criminalizing instruction in a foreign language,
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protected the right of parents to educate their
children. 17 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Court reaffirmed this reasoning, striking down an Oregon
compulsory attendance statute that, in effect, rendered private
education unlawful. 18 Characterizing its earlier decision m
Meyer, the Court observed:
[W]e think it entirely plain that the [Oregon] Act of 1922
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control. . . . The child is not the mere creature of
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations. 19
Both Meyer and Pierce found constitutional support for
parental educational rights in the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Almost twenty years later, in Prince v.
Massachusetts , the Court found support in a new source, the
First
Amendment,
applied
to
the
states
through
15. / d . at 771.
16. See, e.g, Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, 728 P .2d 794 (Mont. 1986);
see also Braintree Baptist Temple v. Holbrook Pub. Sch., 616 F. Supp. 8 1 (D. Mass.
1984); RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS AND Plt!VATE SCHOOLS
207- 11 (2 006); Juli e Underwoo d O'Har a , State Accreditation of Non-Public Schools:
Quality Regulations and the Fi rst Amendment , 1 ED. LAW REP. 5, 5-10 (1982).
17. Meyer v. Nebras ka , 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
18. Pierce v . Soc'y of Sis ters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-35 (1925) .
19. /d.
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incorporation. 20 The petitioner in Prince sought to overturn her
conviction in state court for furnishing a child with religious
leaflets with knowledge that the child would distribute them. 21
Although the Prince Court ultimately rejected the petitioner's
constitutional challenge, it recognized that both religious and
educational liberty interests were at stake. This provided a
new legal foundation for parental rights and gave parents an
additional means of attacking regulations. 22
One such attack proved successful in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 23
In Yoder, the Court upheld an order of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversing judgment against Amish parents for violating
the state compulsory attendance law. 24 The parents had
withdrawn their children from school after eighth grade,
reasoning that the values taught in school were contrary to
Amish religious beliefs and that attendance there was contrary
to the Amish way of life. When the schools complained, the
state charged, tried and convicted the parents, fining them
each five dollars. In defense, the parents asserted that
Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statute violated their
parental rights, as protected by both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 25 The Supreme Court agreed. 26 It characterized
parental educational rights as a form of religious liberty, and
concluded that these rights were due the same consideration
afforded free exercise rights-rights which had trumped
competing state interests since "[l]ong before" anyone
acknowledged a need for public education. In the words of the
Court,
Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need
for universal formal education, the Religion Clauses had
specifically and firmly fixed the right to free exercise of
religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was
an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the
establishment of any religion by government. The values
underlying these two provisions relating to religion have been

20. Prince v. Mass., 32 1 U.S. 158, 165- 66 (1944).
21. Id. at 160.
22. At the time of Prince, parents h ad been making religious arguments against
state educational r egulations for almost ninety years, but mostly to state courts, and
with limited success.
23. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. Id. at 234.
25. Id. at 207- 09.
26. Id. at 236.
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~ealou sly protected, sometimes even at the exrense of other
mterests of admittedly high social importance.2

. The state interest in education, the Court said, was no
different. Where parents chose an education for their children
that functioned to transmit and preserve a particular religious
way of life, the choice was protected by the Free Exercise
Clause-even at the expense of contrary state interests.28
Indeed, to permit otherwise would give the state, not the
parents, a "large measure [of] influence" over a child's religious
29
future. In the Court's view, no historical support existed for
such an outcome, which would run contrary to rights
established "beyond debate" in this country: "The history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition." 30
The Whisner decision fits snugly into this line of cases.
Whisner, like Yoder, accords a "traditional" status to parental
interests in directing the education of children. 31 In contrast,
state interests in regulating education, although significant,
are relatively newfound.32 Because parents have long directed
the education of their children, state regulations that unduly
burden this interest must withstand strict scrutiny. 33 To be
sure, Whisner differs from Yoder in a crucial respect. In Yoder,
the Court considered only Wisconsin's interest in mandating
secondary education until age sixteen, an interest the Court
found less significant than the state interest in primary
education. 34 Yet, this difference goes only to the strength of the

27. Id. at 214.
28. ld. a t 215- 19.
29. Id. at 232.
30. ld.
31. Wh is ner, 351 N. E. 2d at 768.
32. S ee Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26.
33. S ee Whisner, 351 N.E. 2d at 771, 771 n.17; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
34. S ee Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226-28. More precisely, the Yoder Court narrowed the
state interest in question to the interest in ma ndating secondary education between
eighth gra de a nd age sixtee n, since the responde nts had all attended eighth grade and
Wisconsin law required sch ool attendance only until age sixteen. In contrast, in
Whisner, the Ohio Supreme Court was concerned with the state's interest in regulating
the education of all school-age children. See Whisner, 351 N.E. 2d at 751 (describing
regulations in question).
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state's interest, not to the appropriate level of scrutiny 35-the
latter being a much more significant determination . In
contrast, the Yoder Court's view that parents had long enjoyed
control over the education of their children appears to have
supported the application of strict scrutiny. 36 The Whisner
court seems to have employed the history to much the same
end. 37
Educational history figures centrally in the Supreme
Court's analysis of conflicts between parents and the state over
religious education. Yet, the Court's discussion of history is
significantly flawed. 38 It is true that, as Justice Burger noted,
parents have long played the central role in directing the
upbringing of their children. At this level of generality, the
proposition is surely correct. The weakness of the claim is in
the details. As a closer look at the history of education shows,
parents have long ceded important aspects of control over
education-even religious education-to the state. This
suggests that state regulations of religious education deserve
less exacting scrutiny from courts.
For example, the Yoder Court was incorrect in stating that
the Free Exercise Clause protected rights of conscience long
before any perceived need for universal formal education. 39
Several of the country's founders, including Jefferson,
35. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26 (weighing state interest after articulating
standard in part I of the opinion).
36. See id. at 213-14.
37. See Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 768, 771 .
38. I do not mean to suggest that the Court's discussion of the history of
education was uniformly wrong. At least some of what it said about educational
practices and state interests in education is correct. The errors relate to the Court's
discussion of parental interests.
39. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. The support for this claim and the others in this
paragraph will be laid out in detail in Part II.A, infra. Regarding a system of public
education, Jefferson introduced a bill into the Virginia legislature in 1778 proposing a
system of education that included primary and secondary schools. At roughly the same
time, he proposed a Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, a n important forerunn er
of the federal Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court made note of Jefferson's
interest in common schooling in Yoder, but dismissed it on the grounds that J efferson
had not supported mandatory attendance laws. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226 n.1 4. Yet
comp ulsory attendance statutes were hardly the only way states interefered with
parental educational choices; nearly every plank of the common school reform divested
parents of control, including textbook reform (fa milies previously had their own
textbooks), teacher credentialing, and public funding. See infra Part III.B . Moreover,
Jefferson is significant, not as a proponent of mandatory public education, but because
he articulated the reasons a democracy ha s an interest in universal formal education.
See infra Part II.B. These reasons t end to justify compulsory a ttendance sta tutes,
whether Jefferson himself supported such laws or not.
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perceived the need for universal formal education (including
secondary education), expressed that need on many occasions,
and actively supported plans in state legislatures and Congress
in pursuit of that goal. 40 While Jefferson ultimately failed to
push through much of his system, a later generation of
reformers succeeded, still decades before the First Amendment
was applied to protect the religious educational choices of
parents. 41 The Supreme Court thus inverted the order of
events; states regulated religious education long before the
First Amendment was applied to protect parental choices from
state interference.
More generally, the history of American education shows
that we have neither a tradition of absolute parental control
over education, nor a tradition of absolute state control.
Although parents have long had some control over what their
children learn, for how long they learn, and from whom they
learn, states have long sought to appropriate some of this
control, restricting what is learned, for how long, from whom,
and at whose expense. States have done this because of the
importance they have long attached to education. The most
striking example of state appropriation of control over
education is the creation of the common schools in the
nineteenth century. 42 The intense social changes of that time,
including immigration and urbanization, led Americans to look
to universal education as a means of ensuring socal stability. 43
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. See infra Parts III & IV. Here, I refer to the common school reformers. The
common school movement, which they led, began in the 1830s and continued
throughout the nineteenth century. As we will see, the curriculum of the common
schools was religious, yet the schools were regulated by the states. In contrast, the
Supreme Court did not suggest that the First Amendment imposed a limit on state
regulation of religious education un til Prince, in the 1940s. Prince, 32 1 U.S at 165-66.
This is over 100 years after the birth of the common schools. The discrepancy cannot be
explained entirely by the date of incorpora tion of the Religion Clauses. Even in states
whose constitutions possessed similar provisions protecting religious liberty, lawsuits
challenging the religious content of state school curricula were rare in the nineteenth
ce ntury. DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF
PUBLIC ED UCATIO N, 1785-1954 163 (1987) . The first notable state-court challenge of
Bible reading occu rred in the 1850s, and there were only twenty-five such suits over
the seventy yea r period from 1854 to 1924. Id. Below, I analyze one of the earliest such
successful suits, Cinncinnati Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872). See
infra Part IV.B.
42. See infra Part III.B.
43. See infra Part IIIB.; see infra note 44. The social changes I refer to are
primarily t he rise of cities and the influx of Catholic immigrants. These changes
instigated concerns a bout stability.
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Many reformers argued that the state should use schools to
"Americanize" newly-arrived immigrants-a practice clearly
intended to interfere with the efforts of parents to pass on
ethnic, cultural and religious traditions. 44 To that end, school
curricula included explicit religious content. 45 These schools
were funded at least in part by public monies. 46
History also shows that the concepts we use today to
analyze legal, education-related conflicts between parents and
the state are relatively new. Many early educational practices
do not fit neatly into contemporary legal categories. For
example, the distinction between public and private education,
so central today, simply did not exist until the 1830s. 47 Nor
were conflicts between parents and the state typically
conceived of as legal-they were political conflicts and resolved
at the ballot box or in state legislatures. 48 Where legal conflicts
did emerge, "parental rights" lacked constitutional significance.
Although courts at common law recognized a parental right to
control the education of children, those rights could be
abrogated by acts of the legislature, 49 and the assertion that
parental rights were a trump against state regulation did not
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. 50 This suggests
that it is inaccurate to characterize parental rights as
"traditional" in contrast to the powers of the state. 51
This article attempts to illustrate the variety of educational
concepts, theories and practices existent in the early republic
and antebellum periods. As Bernard Bailyn observed in his
work on the subject, a history of American education is a
history of American culture, since education is, in its broadest

44. See, e.g., CARL KAESTLE , PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 77(describing ideology of school reformers); id. at 80
(describing anxieties); id. at 163 (noting the view that the Irish Catholics should be
Americanized in the schools). See also infra Part III.B.
45. See infra Parts II.C. & III. The examples are numerous. Students read from
t he Protestant Bible and sang Protestant hymns, among other things.
46. See, e.g., KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 117; see Part III, infra .
47. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 166-67 (1983).
48. See supra note 380 and accompanying text; see Part IV (describing conflicts
involving Catholics).
49. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Garvin Cty, 103 P . 578 (Okla. 1909)
(recognizing the authority of the parent over the education of the child "except where
modified by statute").
50. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 163 (discussing challenges to
Bible reading in the curriculum).
51. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
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sense, the mechanism by which one generation transmits its
culture to the next. 52 Such a work is obviously beyond the scope
of a short paper. This article by no means purports to offer a
complete account of education history, or even, for that matter,
a modestly detailed one. Instead, it aims to adduce details and
highlight trends documented by leading education historians.
Using the scholarship of Lawrence Cremin, Carl Kaestle, and
David Tyack as a foundation, this article draws original legal
conclusions about parental interests and religious liberties. 53
Although the works of Cremin, Kaestle and Tyack are wellknown in the fields of education and history, 54 they have
received relatively scant attention in the field of law. 55 While
there is a substantial body of historical literature on federal
jurisprudence of religious education after the first World War, 56
not enough has been said in legal scholarship about education
in earlier periods, during which the American tradition of joint
parent-state control over education took shape.

B. Education and the Meaning of the Religion Clauses
An awareness of the history of education is also essential

52 . BERNARD BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 14
(1960).
53. See, e.g. , TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41; KAESTLE, supra note 44;
LAWRENCE CREMIN, A.M:ERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 1783-1876
(1980) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE); LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN
EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 1607-1783 (1970) [hereinafter THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE].
54. For an example of its use in larger, synthetic histories, see DANIEL WALKER
HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at

449-55 (2007).
55. See, e.g., MARTHA C . NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 214- 21 (2008); NOAH FELDMAN,
DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do
ABOUT IT 57-110 (2005) [hereinafter DIVIDED BY GOD); Michael N ewson, Common
School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
219 (2002); John E. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001).
56. See, e.g., WILL!AlVJS ROSS, FORGI NG NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927 (1996); Eric DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic
Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 B .Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 363 (2003); Edward
Gaffney, Jr. , Pie rce and Parental Liberty as a Core Value in Educational Policy, 78 U.
DET. MERCY L . REV. 491 (2001); J a y S. Bybee , Substantive Due Process and Free
Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L .
REV. 887 (1996). For a contemporary treatment of these issues , see JAMES DWYER,
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); ROBERT KUNZMAN, GRAPPLING WITH
THE GOOD (2006); Rob Reich, Opting Out of Education: Yoder, Mozert, and the
Autonomy of Children, 52 EDUC. THEORY 445 (2003) .
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for First Amendment scholarship. Scholars of the Religion
Clauses often overlook the significance of educational practices.
For example, while it is true that, as a leading scholar
observed, "by 1834, no state in the Union would have an
established church," 57 states continued to support and to
regulate religious education long past 1834, until the end of the
nineteenth century. As is now well documented in historical
scholarship, the common school system, which was created
during this period, was, in effect, state-sponsored Protestant
education, replete with singing hymns, reciting prayers, and
reading the King James Bible-as well as discrimination and
violence directed towards non-Protestants. For this reason, it is
hard to regard "universal disestablishment" as evidence that by
1834 "the tradition of separation between church and state
would seem an ingrained and vital part of our constitutional
58
system." How could that be, when the school system-then
the country's largest and most successful bureaucracy, short of
the military-was devoted to inculcating sectarian religious
beliefs? 59 Even after universal disestablishment, states offered
denominational instruction in public schools and funded many
parochial schools. 60
Even where legal scholars take note of the history of
education, they often paint only a partial picture. Again, First
Amendment scholarship provides an illustration. Our
educational practices pose a challenge for scholars of the First
Amendment because they do not fit neatly into the leading
accounts of religious liberty. Accounts of the Religion Clauses
can be divided into equality theories and liberty theories. 61
57. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Hi storical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 H ARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437 (1990).
58. ld.
59. See infra Part III.
60. See KAcESTLE, supra note 44, at 167 (describing the use of public funds to
support Catholic schools and observing, "[t]he idea of separation of church and state
with regard to education did not spring full-blown from the United States Constitution.
It was a public policy developed gradually and unevenly at the local level during the
nineteenth century.").
6L This distinct ion is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor is it the only possible
distinction between different acco unts of our religious liberties. For exa mple, another
common distinction is between voluntarism, or separatism, and nonpreferentialism.
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 495, 507 (2003). The voluntari smnonpreferentialism distinction shares elements in common with li berty theory-equality
theory distinction. But there are differences between the distinctions as well. Most
notably, the voluntarism-nonpreferentialism distinction is, at its core, a doctrinal
distinction, while the liberty theory-equality theory distinction is best described as a
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Accordin.g to equality th~~ries, the purpose of the Religion
c;au~es ~S to p~e~erve pofLtLCa[ equality by protecting members
o mmonty rehgw~s from members of majority religions. To
take ~he most promment example, Justice O'Connor defends an
equahty theor~ of the Establishment Clause, under which the
~·laus~ constrams the public display of religious symbols She
Irst mtroduced the equality theory in her concurren~e in
2
Ly nch u. Donnelly. ~ Lynch ~oncerned an Establishment Clause
challenge to a C.hnstmas display in a city park. 63 Writing for
the Court, Ju.stice Burger applied Lemon v. Kurtzman and
upheld the display. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
attempted to refocus Lemon. She suggested that at its core the
Es~a?lishment Clause prohibited the governme~t from making
r ehgwn releva nt to political standing. 64 The government would
offend this principle if it indicated that Christians were
members of a favored, inside group, and non-Chr istians
disfavored outsiders.65 O'Connor argued that the city display in
Lynch did not communicate such a message . The variety of
symbols in the display suggested the celebration of a shared,
public holiday, not religious favoritism. 66 In broader terms, the
public display left undisturbed the political equality of
Christians and non-Christians. Justice O'Connor's equality
theory thus articulates a limit on public displays of r eligious
symbols. 67
Martha Nussbaum defends a broader version of the
equality theory, arguing that both the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause are best understood in terms of
political equality. 68 Moreover, unlike Justice O'Connor in
Ly nch,69 Nussbaum defends h er equality theory on historical
grounds. According to Nussbaum, history shows that the
"dominant American political tradition" rejects "in-group"

di sti nction between competin g political va lues.
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) ; Noah Feldman. From Liberty to
Equality: The Tra nsf'ormation of' the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. RF.V. 673. 694
(2002) [hereina fter Liberty to Equality].
6:3. Lynch, 46fl U.S. at 671-72.
64. Id. at 672 (q uoting Lemon v. Kurtzman , 40 :~ U. S. 602, 614 (I971)) .
65. Jd. at 687- 88.
6 6. Jd. at 688.
67. Th e court endorsed O'Connor's equality th eory of th e Establishment Clause in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU , 492 U.S. fl73 (1989).
68. NUSSBAUM, supra note fl5 , at 16.
G9. Liberty to Equality, supra note 62, at 694.

278

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

Many reformers argued that the state should use schools to
"Americanize" newly-arrived immigrants-a practice clearly
intended to interfere with the efforts of parents to pass on
ethnic, cultural and religious traditions. 44 To that end, school
curricula included explicit religious content. 45 These schools
were funded at least in part by public monies. 46
History also shows that the concepts we use today to
analyze legal, education-related conflicts between parents and
the state are relatively new. Many early educational practices
do not fit neatly into contemporary legal categories. For
example, the distinction between public and private education,
so central today, simply did not exist until the 1830s. 47 Nor
were conflicts between parents and the state typically
conceived of as legal-they were political conflicts and resolved
at the ballot box or in state legislatures. 48 Where legal conflicts
did emerge, "parental rights" lacked constitutional significance.
Although courts at common law recognized a parental right to
control the education of children, those rights could be
abrogated by acts of the legislature,49 and the assertion that
parental rights were a trump against state regulation did not
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. 50 This suggests
that it is inaccurate to characterize parental rights as
"traditional" in contrast to the powers of the state. 51
This article attempts to illustrate the variety of educational
concepts, theories and practices existent in the early republic
and antebellum periods. As Bernard Bailyn observed in his
work on the subject, a history of American education is a
history of American culture, since education is , in its broadest

44. See, e.g., CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 77(describing ideology of school reformers); id. at 80
(describing anxieties); id. at 163 (noting the view that the Irish Catholics should be
Americanized in the schools). See also infra Part III. B.
45. See infra Parts Il.C. & III. The examples are numerous. Students read from
the Protestant Bible and sang Protestant hymns, among other things.
46. See, e.g. , KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 117; see Part Ill, infra.
47. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 166-67 (1983).
48. See supra note 380 a nd accompanying text; see Part IV (describing conflicts
involving Catholics).
49. See, e.g. , Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Garvin Cty, 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909)
(recognizing the authority of the parent over the education of t he child "except where
modified by statute").
50. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 163 (discussing challenges to
Bible reading in the curriculum) .
51. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214.
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sense, the mechanism by which one generation transmits its
culture to the next. 52 Such a work is obviously beyond the scope
of a short paper. This article by no means purports to offer a
complete account of education history, or even, for that matter,
a modestly detailed one. Instead, it aims to adduce details and
highlight trends documented by leading education historians.
Using the scholarship of Lawrence Cremin, Carl Kaestle, and
David Tyack as a foundation, this article draws original legal
conclusions about parental interests and religious liberties. 53
Although the works of Cremin, Kaestle and Tyack are wellknown in the fields of education and history, 54 they have
received relatively scant attention in the field of law. 55 While
there is a substantial body of historical literature on federal
jurisprudence of religious education after the first World War, 56
not enough has been said in legal scholarship about education
in earlier periods, during which the American tradition of joint
parent-state control over education took shape.

B. Education and the Meaning of the Religion Clauses
An awareness of the history of education is also essential

52 . BERNARD BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SO CIETY 14
(1960).
53. S ee, e.g., 'I'YACK, JAMES & B ENAVOT, supra note 41; KAESTLE, supra note 44;
LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EX PERIENCE, 1783-1876
(1980) [here inafter TH E NATIONAL EXPERIENCE) ; LAWRENCE CREMIN , AMERICAN
EDU CATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 1607-1783 (1970) [hereinafter THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE).
54. For an example of its use in larger, synthetic his tories, see DANIEL WALKER
HOW E, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at

449-55 (2007) .
55. See, e.g., MARTHA C . NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN D EFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 214- 21 (2008); NOAH FELDMAN,
DIVIDED BY GoD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM- AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO
ABOUT IT 57-llO (2005) [hereinafter DIVIDED BY GOD}; Michael Newson, Common
School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, ll S . CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J.
219 (2002); John E. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH . L. REV. 279 (2001).

56. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917- 1927 (1996); Eric DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic
Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 363 (2003); Edward
Gaffney, Jr., Pierce and Parental Liberty as a Core Value in Educational Policy, 78 U.
DET. MER CY L . REV . 491 (2001); Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free
Exercise of Religion: M eyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yod er, 25 CAP. U. L.
REV. 887 (1996). For a contemporary treatment of these issues, see JAMES DWY ER,
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); ROBERT KUNZMAN, GRAPPLING WITH
THE GOOD (2006); Rob Reich , Opting Out of Education: Yoder, Mozert, and the
Autonomy of Children , 52 EDUC. THEORY 445 (2003).
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for First Amendment scholarship. Scholars of the Religion
Clauses often overlook the significance of educational practices.
For example, while it is true that, as a leading scholar
observed, "by 1834, no state in the Union would have an
established church," 57 states continued to support and to
regulate religious education long past 1834, until the end of the
nineteenth century. As is now well documented in historical
scholarship, the common school system, which was created
during this period, was, in effect, state-sponsored Protestant
education, replete with singing hymns, reciting prayers, and
reading the King James Bible-as well as discrimination and
violence directed towards non-Protestants. For this reason, it is
hard to regard "universal disestablishment" as evidence that by
1834 "the tradition of separation between church and state
would seem an ingrained and vital part of our constitutional
system." 58 How could that be, when the school system-then
the country's largest and most successful bureaucracy, short of
the military-was devoted to inculcating sectarian religious
beliefs? 59 Even after universal disestablishment, states offered
denominational instruction in public schools and funded many
parochial schools. 60
Even where legal scholars take note of the history of
education, they often paint only a partial picture. Again, First
Amendment scholarship provides an illustration. Our
educational practices pose a challenge for scholars of the First
Amendment because they do not fit neatly into the leading
accounts of religious liberty. Accounts of the Religion Clauses
can be divided into equality theories and liberty theories. 61
57. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 10.'3 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 14.'37 (1990).
58. !d.
59. See infra Part III.
60. See KAESTLE, supra note 44 , at 167 (describing the use of public funds to
support Catholic school s and observing, "[t]he idea of separation of church and state
with r egard to education did not spring full-blown from the United States Constitution.
It was a public policy developed gradually and unevenly at the local level during the
nineteenth century.").
61. This distinction is not intended to be exh a ustive. Nor is it the onl y possible
distinct ion between differ ent accounts of our religious libertie s. For example, another
common distinction is between voluntarism, or separatism, and nonpreferentialism .
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN , FIRST AMENDMENT L AW 495, 507 (200.'3). The vo1untarismnonpreferentialism distinction shar es elements in common with liberty theor y-equality
theory di stinction. But there are differences between the distinctions as well. Most
notably, the voluntarism-nonpreferentialism distinction is, at its core, a doctrinal
distinction, while the liberty theory-equality theory dist inction is best descr ibed as a
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According to equality theories, the purpose of the Religion
Clauses is to preserve political equality by protecting members
of minority religions from members of majority religions. To
take the most prominent example, Justice O'Connor defends an
equality theory of the Establishment Clause, under which the
clause constrains the public display of religious symbols. She
first introduced the equality theory in her concurrence in
Lynch u. Donnelly. 62 Lynch concerned an Establishment Clause
challenge to a Christmas display in a city park. 63 Writing for
the Court, Justice Burger applied Lemon u. Kurtzman a nd
upheld the display. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
attempted to refocus Lemon. She suggested that, at its core, the
Establishment Clause prohibited the government from making
religion relevant to political standing. 64 The government would
offend this principle if it indicated that Christians were
members of a favored, inside group, and non-Christians
disfavored outsiders.65 O'Connor argued that the city display in
Lynch did not communicate such a message. The variety of
symbols in the display suggested the celebration of a shared,
public holiday, not religious favoritism. 66 In broader terms, the
public display left undisturbed the political equality of
Christians and non-Christians. Justice O'Connor's equality
theory thus articulates a limit on public displays of religious
symbols. 67
Martha Nussbaum defends a broader version of the
equality theory, arguing that both the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause are best understood in terms of
political equality. 68 Moreover, unlike Justice O'Connor in
Lynch, 69 Nussbaum defends her equality theory on historical
grounds. According to Nussbaum, history shows that the
"dominant American political tradition" rejects "in-group"

distinction between competing political values.
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U .S. 668, 687 (1984); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to
Equality: The Transform ation of the Establishm ent Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 67::l, 694
(2002) [h e reinafter Liberty to Equality].
6:1. Lynch, 465 U.S . at 671- 72.
64. ld. at 672 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
65. ld. at 687- 88.
66. Id. at 688.
67. The court endorsed O'Connor's equality theory of the Establishment Clause in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
68. NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 16.
69. Liberty to Equality, supra note 62, at 694.
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favoritism and embraces religious equality_7° In particular, the
American tradition connects political equality with a special
regard for the conscience. The individual conscience is unique,
valuable and vulnerable; it is the means by which individuals
search for what is ultimately valuable in life.7 1 A society that
purports to treat people as equals thus ought to accord the
conscience of each individual equal respect and afford it some
protection against governmental encroachment. While equal
respect in matters of conscience does not mean conceding the
truth of others' religious beliefs, 72 it does require placing
restrictions on the public display of symbols (as O'Connor's
equality theory did), as well as accommodation from some laws
that impinge on religious beliefs and conduct.
Liberty theorists take a different view of the meaning of the
Religion Clauses. Under the liberty theory, the purpose of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is to protect liberty of
conscience, not political equality. 73 For example, Noah Feldman
rejects the view of equality theorists that the Establishment
Clause was designed to protect religious minorities from
persecution by majorities, a paradigmatic violation of political
equality. 74 Instead, according to Feldman, both the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses aim to protect
individuals from coercion. 75 Coercion is problematic because of
the special role the conscience plays in the formation of
religious beliefs. The conscience, according to this view, informs
us of our religious duties. Neither the church nor the state has
the power to change what conscience dictates. Since individuals
cannot consent to compulsion in matters of conscience, a
government whose power derives from the consent of the
governed has no authority to coerce in matters of conscience. 76
According to Feldman, the founders drew on the liberty of
conscience in their resistance to the use of tax receipts to fund
establishment churches. Imposing a tax to support a religious
70. NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 2~5.
71. Id. at 52~53.
72. Id. at 23.
73. Nussbaum's equality theory also made use of the notion of conscience. But
unlike Nussbaum's equality theory, in which preserving political equality is the reason
we protect individual choices in matters of conscience, liberty theories explain religious
protections in terms of the value of conscience itself.
74. Liberty to Equality, supra note 62, at 682~83.
75. DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 48.
76. Id. at 27~28.
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institution or official whom one does not support, they argued,
violates liberty of conscience. 77 The scope of both the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause reflects
just this concern; where coercion against conscience is not at
issue-for example, in the public display of religious symbolsconstitutional protections are not implicated. 78
However, the history of education supports neither a pure
equality theory nor a pure liberty theory. For example, consider
the common school system, the forerunner of today's public
school system. In the cities, the common schools evolved from
charity schools run by urban churches and religious voluntary
associations. 79 These organizations provided free schooling to
the children of the poor on the theory that it was necessary to
intervene between the parent and the child to save the child
from a life of poverty. 80 Intervention was accomplished by
schooling. The curriculum was strongly moral and religious,
and included instruction in the sponsoring denomination's most
basic commitments and practices. The common schools that
emerged from the charity schools largely adopted the same
philosophy. They aimed to impose on children a common
religious and moral character, while preparing them to live in a
democracy and "Americanizing" the newly arrived immigrants,
many of whom were Catholics. 81 At a theoretical level, then,
the common school system and its predecessors were
thoroughly republican: their express aim was to instill "virtue"
in the attending children, not to respect individual rights. 82
77. ld. at 32.
78. Strangely enough, Ma dison believe d that assessments in support of
established churches, which allowed the taxpayer to elect a recipient, a lso violated the
liberty of conscie nce. Irving Brant, Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8
WM. & MARY Q. 4, 12 (19 51) . F eldman a rgues in DI VIDED BY GOD that, for the same
r eason , nonpreferentialism- the public support of religious activities in a way that
expresses no preference betwee n them-viola tes the liberty of conscience. Thus
Feldman's version of the liberty theory would in fact rule out nonpreferential programs
of public support for religion. Despite its pedigree, this argument is sub tle at best. It is
not apparent that a liberty theory of the Esta blishment Clause would be r equired to
r eject nonpreferenti a l public support of religion. Of course, an equality theory of t h e
Establishment Clause would likely rej ect nonpreferential public support of religion.
The equality theory is sensitive to the poli tical status of nonbelievers as well as
believers; even if public s upport wa s nonpreferential among religious groups, by
definition it expre sses a preference between religion and non-religion.
79. See infra Part II. C.
80. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 32-33; see infra Parts II. C. & III.B.
81. See infra Part Ill. B.
82. "The republican style of American educa tion was co mpounded of four
fundament al beliefs: that ed ucation wa s crucial to the vitality of the Republic; that a
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Protestantism supplied those virtues. Indeed, schooling could
not have accomplished its purpose had it been impermissible to
impose favored religious beliefs.
The practice of imposing favored religious beliefs threatens
both liberty of conscience and political equality. As a result,
liberty theorists and equality theorists may tend towards a
version of America's educational history that emphasizes
respect for liberty of conscience and political equality and
downplays inconsistent practices. But to understand the
meaning and scope of our religious liberties, we must
acknowledge the history of our efforts to influence matters of
conscience and to tie religion to political standing. Liberty
theories and equality theories may be able to acknowledge
these practices, but doing so will surely require a modification
of their central claims.

* * *

proper republican education consisted of the diffusion of knowledge, the nurturance of
virtue (including patriotic civility), a nd the cultivation of learning; that schools and
colleges were the best agencies ... ; and that the most effective means of obtaining the
requisite number and kind of schools was through some system tied to the polity." THE
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE , supra note 53, at 148. See also note 105 and accompanying
text.
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This article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, the article
discusses the importance that the founders ascribed to formal
education, focusing on the significance of public virtue and
homogeneity. This part also contrasts ambitious plans for state
systems of free schools proposed by Thomas Jefferson and
Benjamin Rush with the actual schooling practices of the
period, which were variegated and subject almost exclusively to
local control. In Part III, the article discusses the rise of the
common school system in the early nineteenth century,
focusing on the social changes that gave new force to old
arguments for systematic, free schooling, as well as the
religious content of the common school curriculum. This
discussion highlights important changes introduced by common
school reformers to the educational theories of the founders.
Part IV of the article discusses the most important source of
resistance to common school reform-the Catholic school
movement. Catholics transformed educational practices by
creating their own schools, contesting the use of public funds,
and challenging the overtly Protestant content of the common
school curriculum. Each of these disputes was important in
shaping public education and religious education. Part V of the
article returns to the themes of the Introduction and assesses
the significance of the history of education for courts and for
First Amendment scholarship.
II. EARLY AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. The Context of American Education

The earliest plans for formal schooling in America arose in
an educational context very different than today. In
seventeenth century England, education took place almost
exclusively in the home, the community, and the church. 83
These institutions provided informal instruction, consisting
mostly of basic socialization, moral instruction, and vocational
training. Personal enrichment and scholarship were, in
contrast, of very little concern. 84 Formal education was carried
out in institutions outside the home and church, predominantly
in English grammar schools and universities . Surprisingly,
83. See BAILYN, supra note 52, at 15- 18.
84. !d.
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personal enrichment and scholarship were not the focus of
formal education either. Instead, like informal education,
formal education was predominantly utilitarian; for example,
reading and writing led to literacy, which had economic and
social value for nearly everyone. 85 Utility also formed the basis
of the limited state interest in education-an interest that was
expressed primarily in terms of control, rather than subsidy.
As Bernard Bailyn put it, the state was "exhortatory,
empowering, supervisory, [and] regulatory," but "neither
initiating nor sustaining." 86 Instead of enjoying public financial
support, most schools relied on private gifts. 87
In America, English educational practices quickly changed,
due to the challenges of settling a new land. America was a
wilderness, and in the wilderness many of the social structures
that supported informal education in England simply did not
exist, or failed. 88 For example, the demands of settlement
undermined parental authority, since children were hardier
and more adaptable, and thus possessed a natural advantage
over their older parents. The need for parents to engage in
menial labor and the starvation the colonists often faced also
damaged parental stature. 89 Colonists understood the failure of
the parental authority and other social structures as a moral
indictment of their life in the new world. The Puritans of
Massachusetts Bay took this indictment particularly seriously
and, in response, transformed implicit, informal and moderate
norms into explicit, formal and severe regulations, many of
which regulated the most intimate matters of family life. 90
Around 1663, Jonathan Mitchell explained: "We in this
country, being far removed from the more cultivated parts of
the world, had need to use utmost care and diligence to keep up
learning and all helps to education among us, lest degeneracy,
barbarism, ignorance and irreligion do by degrees break in
upon us." 91
85. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 176 (describing how the
incr eased availability of schooling in seventeenth century Engl a nd led to an increase in
t h e literacy rate).
86. BAILYN, supra note 52, a t 20.
87. !d.
88. THE COLONIAL EXPERI ENCE, supra note 53, a t 135, 176-77; BAILYN, supra
not e 52, at 22.
89. BAILYN, supra note 52, a t 22.
90. !d. at 23.
91. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 177 (quoting Jonathan
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The threat of "barbarism" in colonial America led to two
major changes in traditional educational practices. First,
formal education became more important than it previously
had been. Schools began to provide the moral instruction that
had previously been carried out wholly in the home and church.
Massachusetts Bay illustrates this development. 92 There,
colonists began to establish free primary schools for the moral
instruction of children in 1635, within about five years of their
arrival. 93 Twelve years later , in 164 7, the Massachusetts
General Court passed the School Act, requiring towns with a
population over 50 to establish primary schools, and towns
with a population over 100 to establish grammar schools. 94
These schools were financed by a variety of means, including
rents, taxes, subscription fees, donations of land, grants, and
private tuition. 95 Connecticut and Plymouth passed similar
laws shortly thereafter. 96
Second, the state (in this case, the colonial government)
began to regulate educational practices inside the home. 97
Massachusetts Bay again provides an example. Among its
many other regulations of family life, the colony required
families to provide children the kinds of vocational and moral
instruction they had previously provided in England. 98 To be
sure, while there existed penalities for breaking these laws,
little evidence exists that the laws were enforced. 99
Nevertheless, the laws mark an early expression of state
interest in moral and religious education, and in the state's

Mitchell , A Modell for the Maintaining of S tudents and Fellows of Chaise Abilities at
the Colledge in Cam bridge, PUB!,ICA'fJONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF
MASSACHUSETTS XXXI, 3 11 (1935)).
92. Of course, one ca nnot u s ually generalize from Massachusetts Bay to the other
colonies. There were important differences between the education al practices of
Virginia, Ma ssachusetts, and New York. However, since the practices of this period are
not the focus of this paper, I omit these differences . See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE,
supra note 53, at 9- 20, 176--91.
93. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 180.
94. ld. at 181- 82.
95. See id. at 181, 184, 193.
96. /d. at 182.
97. / d. at 176; see BAILYN, supra note 52, at 23.
98. BAILYN, supra note 52, at 23-24; see THE COLONJAI, EXPERIENCE, supra note
53, at 124- 25.
99. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, wpra note 53, at 126 ("These laws relating to
household education are best viewed as essentially normative but only partially
descriptive, and we shall never know precisely the extent to which they were actually
honored or ob eyed.") .
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willingness to supplant the family when it perceived a threat of
breakdown. 100
Two breakdowns in particular threatened the colonists.
First, in Massachusetts Bay, colonists were acutely sensitive to
the risk of moral breakdown. 101 Second, in both Massachusetts
and Virginia, colonists were sensitive to the risk of social and
political breakdown, starvation, and the failure of the
settlement. 102 By posing these dangers of breakdown, the
wilderness of America transformed education into a "matter of
public concern," implicating the interests of the state in a new
way. 103 This in turn led to greater state involvement and less
familial control over the education of youth. This same impetus
and change exist in both the founding and antebellum periods.
In both periods, concerns over political and social instability
give risk to assertions of state control over education. Of
course, for obvious reasons, the founders were deeply concerned
with political and social instability. They articulate these
dangers, however, in a language different from the language of
the colonists of Massachusetts Bay-the language of
republicanism.

B. Educational Theory and Reform in the Founding Period
1. Formal education and virtue
The founders believed that formal education was of central
importance to republican government. At a general level, there
appears to have been broad agreement that this was because

100. S ee BAILYN, supra note 52, a t 26-27; TH E COLONIAL EXPERli!:NC E, supra note
53, a t 12 6.
101. See THE COLO NIAL EXP EHI EN CE, supra note 53, a t 163, 176- 77 (d escribing the
threat of "sata nic barba ri s m" posed by the wilderness); id. a t 18 1 (quoting the School
Act, whi ch argu ed th a t education was necessary to enabl e individuals to r ead the
Bibl e); see also id. at 15- 16 (observing th a t th e Puritans "we re seekin g to de mons tra te
t o t he world at la rge the nature a nd practicability of a divinely order Christia n
common wealth . . .. [W]ithin such a society education would assume ut mos t importance
... a s an agency for delibera tely purs uing a cultura l idea l.").
102. See id. a t 18-14 (di scu ssing early English a tte mpts a t coloni zation in Virginia
and noting, "by 162 2, it had become a ppa rent that the Engli s h experi ence in t he New
World would be fund a mentally different t han the Spanish, that its success would be
tied to t he developme nt of self·sufficient a gricultural and trading co mmuniti es, that
self· s uffi ciency would sooner or later r equire the planting of fa mili es, a nd that the
pla nting of fa mili es would be facilitated by [educati onal] institutions lik es t hose of
England .'').
103. THE COLO:-.J IAL EXPEIUENCE, supra note 53, at 198.
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formal education functioned to impart virtue to students. 104 Yet
there were different views of why virtue was significant in a
republic. For example, according to the view of republicanism
dominant in America before the Revolution, virtue was
necessary for the survival of republics because it ensured the
obedience of citizens to legal authority. 105 In a monarchy, the
"magnificence" and power of the monarch so impressed his
subjects that they obeyed law out of fear. But in a republic, the
rulers were servants of the citizens they ruled. Legislators
possessed neither the magnificence of the monarch nor his
power, since they governed only by the consent of the people
and could b~ removed by them. 106 For the republic to survive,
the people simply had to be willing to obey the laws. This
required a sense of public virtue, of sacrificing one's private
interests to the common good. If a republic's citizens were not
virtuous, it would descend into licentiousness or anarchy. 107
Some of the founders clearly believed that formal education
was necessary to ensure that a republic's laws were obeyed. In
a relatively late statement of this view, Benjamin Rush argued
that public education ought to teach a pupil that:
he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property.
Let him be taught to love his family, but let him be taught, at
the same time, that he must forsake and even forget them,
when the welfare of his country requires it .... He must love
private life, but he must decline no station, however public or
responsible it may be, when called to it by the suffrages of his
fellow citizens .... He must love character, and have a due
sense of injuries , but he must be taught to appeal only to the
laws of the state, to defend the one, and punish the other. 108
According to the pre-revoluntionary Whig, representative

104. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 8.
105. GORDON 8. WOOD, TH E CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
66 (2d. ed. 1998).
106. ld.
107. See id. at 67-68.
108. BENJAMIN RUSH , A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND
THE DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN PENNSYLVANIA 20-21 (1786), quoted in David Tyack ,

Forming the National Character: Paradox in the Educational Thought of the
Revolutionary Generation, 36 HARV. ED. REV. 29, 34 (1966); see also KAESTLE, supra
note 44, at 4-5 ("How, then , were [Americans] to escape the degeneration into anarchy
that they believed was the inevitable fate of pure democracies? ... Political theorists
were therefore concerned not only wit h protecting liberty . . ., but also with
maintaining order .... Education could play an important role in reconciling fr eedom
and order.") .

290

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

bodies would naturally pass laws that promoted the common
good. 109 A virtuous individual would recognize the good in the
legislature's laws and would be inclined, because of his public
virtue, to set aside his narrow private interests in favor of the
common interest. 110 Public virtue would thus imbue citizens
with an internal inclination to follow the law. 111
Later statements often reflect a different understanding of
the significance of formal education for a republic. As Bernard
Bailyn and Gordon Wood have shown, the republicanism of
American Whigs was under heavy pressure during the 1 770s
and 1780s, and many aspects of their ideology drifted. 112
Changes in republicanism may have affected the public
discourse about formal education. A broad set of views emerged
about the relationship between formal education and
government.
First, some founders argued that formal education was
essential for preparing republican leaders. 113 According to
Jefferson, writing in 1818, one of the objects of higher
education was to "form the statesmen, legislators and judges,
on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so
much to depend." 114 Education would do this by making leaders
well informed. "[W]here government is in the hands of the
people," observed Noah Webster, "knowledge should be
universally diffused by means of public schools. Of such
consequence is it to society that the people who make laws
should be well informed that I conceive no legislature can be
justified in neglecting proper establishments for this
purpose." 115 Being well informed, to be sur.e, was in part a
scholarly accomplishment, but it was a normative one as well.

109. WOOD, supra note 105, at 56.
110. WooD. supra note 105, at 68.
111. Encouraging respect for the law was hardly the only republican line of
thought a bout education with which the founders would h ave been familiar. Locke's
theory that education was necessary for a n informed consent to government, and that
most people were improvable by education, was of course well known. See THE
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 419-421, 439. Robert Molesworth's work, An
Account of Denmark, A s It Was in the Year 1692, emphasized the importance of an
education in public virtu e to preserving liberty and preventing tyranny. ld. at 425.
Founders' views of education reflected both theses.
112. See BAILYN, sup ra note 52, at 45- 49; WOOD, supra note 105, at 46-90.
11 3. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 6.
114. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGI:-JIA (Aug. 1-4,
1818), quoted in THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 111 (1980).
115. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 24.
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Schools were to serve as "nurseries of wise and good men,"
educating future leaders so that they could later perceive the
common good. 116 An education in virtue was thus necessary to
prepare leaders. 117
Second, many regarded education as crucial to the
substantive reform of the people themselves. 118 According to
this line of thought, the people had to be improved for
republican government to survive. 119 This was necessary to
protect the government from the vicissitudes of the people. 120
Washington emphasized this point in his Farewell Address.
Arguing that future governments should provide "institutions
for the general diffusion of knowledge," Washington observed,
"In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to
public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be
enlightened." 12 1 Jefferson also expressed concern that public
opinion be educ~ted, in order to "give a wholesome direction" to
the force which served as the ultimate guardian of public
welfare . 122 Demographic changes in America served to heighten
this concern. While in Jefferson's mind the yeoman farmer was
naturally virtuous, immigration was already signaling his
relative decline, and those now entering the country could not
be assumed to be naturally virtuous. 123 Virtue and knowledge
were especially important if citizens were to instruct their
representatives, as was sometimes the practice; 124 but they
were also important for even the indirect exercise of popular
116. ld. at 23; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 6.
117. This proposition stands somewhat in tension with traditional republican
theory. On that th eory, the com mon good was public welfare, and was determined by
common consent. If the people were allowed to rule themselves, as was the case in a
republic, they would almost a lways promote the com mon good. To imagine that the
legislature might act against the common good was nearly a contradiction . See WOOD,
supra note 105, at 56. Why such a body would need a virtuous leader is unclear.
11 8. DIVIDED BY Goo, supra note 55, at 58-59.
119. Id.; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 14 ("One way to save
republican government from the uninstructed minds a nd unruly wills of t he people was
to educate the citizens correctly-that is, to instill proper civic beliefs and mold upright
individual character.").
120. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 15.
121. Washington 's
Farewell
Address
(1796),
available
at
http://avalon.law. ya le.edu/1 8th_century/washing. asp.
122. ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 180
(1962) ; cf THE FED ERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) ("[I]t is the reason , alone, of the
public that ought to controul a nd regulate the government. 'fhe passions ought to be
controuled and regulated by the government.") .
123. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 5.
124. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 24.
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control, since education was necessary for citizens to vote
intelligently. 125 As Benjamin Rush saw it in 1785, what
republicanism required was that individuals set aside their
local interests for the common good; education could make this
possible by turning men into "republican machines." 126
Third, a formal education was also necessary to protect "the
people" from the excesses of government. This line of reasoning
had long been applied outside the context of republican
government: education served to protect the people against a
demagogue attempting to upset the historical, customary
"constitution," and, conversely, ignorance served a demagogue's
ends. 127 But the dysfunction of state legislatures in the 1780s
suggested to the founders that an education in virtue was
necessary even to limit the excesses of a republican
legislature. 128 Contrary to the traditional republican theory,
under which the only danger attendant to republican
government was licentiousness or anarchy, a government of the
people in fact also posed a danger of tyranny. 129 Education was
necessary for the people to resist. Thus, in the preamble to his
Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, first proposed
in the Virginia Assembly in 1778, Jefferson suggested that
even the people of a republic would require education so that
they could recognize and resist "ambition under all its
shapes." 130 As Jefferson then understood it, even republican
government could tyrannize the people. 131

2. The school system and homogenity
More important than any of these particular theories,
however, was the goal of transforming the haphazard and
highly localized schools prevalent at the founding into a school
125. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 5.
126. WOOD, supra note 105, at 426; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at
34.
127. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 25 (quoting Justice Joseph
Story in On the Science of Government as a Branch of Popular Education, in THE
INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE AND THE LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTE IN BOSTON, AUGUST 1834 248-7 5 (Boston, 1835)).
128. Cf. WOOD, supra note 105, at 426 (discussing t he need to educate the people to
cure vice, but not differentiating between excesses of government and vicissitudes of
popular opinion).
129. ld. at 62 .
130. Thomas J efferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, ~ 1
(1778), available at http:/loll.libertyfund.org/title/755/86186.
131. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 439.
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system. As the founders saw it, some form of common,
institutionalized education was necessary to homogenize the
citizens of America's broadly diverse and distant regions.m
Montesquieu's well known theory required republics to be
small and homogenous, to ensure that the interests of the
citizens would be roughly similar. 133 America, in contrast, was
neither small nor homogenous. 134 Already by 1785, Jefferson
expressed the worry that immigration was turning the
Confederation into a "heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted
mass." 135 Moreover, the colonies differed from each other in
striking ways, from climate and culture to economy. The
founders understood that these differences could produce
divergent political interests. 136 As Shay's rebellion m
Massachusetts evidenced, even within one state, such
differences could boil over into overt hostility. 137
Creating a shared national identity strong enough to
support loyalty to the republic was thus a central concern.
Washington, for example, suggested that "[t]he more
homogenous our citizens can be made in [principles, opinions,
and manners], the greater will be our prospect of permanent
union." 138 Textbook authors sought to contribute to
homogeneity by standardizing American English spelling and
pronunciation, as Webster famously did in The American
Spelling Book. 139 However, the centerpiece of the effort,
132. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 4- 5.
133. See MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Of the Corruption of the Principles of
the Three Governments bk. 8, ch. 16; WOOD, supra note 105, at 356.
134. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) (comparing the current
dimensions of the country to European countries with representative systems).
135. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 156--57 (1785), quoted in THE
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 117 (1980); see also DIVIDED BY GOD, supra
note 55, at 58 ("The common purpose necessary to sustain a republic called for shared
knowledge and common moral values , neither of which could be taken for granted in a
changing America."). Jefferson's concern seems relatively unobjectionable in the
context of Montesquieu's theory of republics and the political problems faced by the
framers. Nevertheless, this quotation is perhaps the first example of a sentiment that
could be construed less positively, namely, as anti-immigrant and assimilationist. See
infra Parts III.B. & V.B.
136. See, e.g. , NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 295 (1966)
(comments of James Madison, July 14) (discussing the "real division of interests"
between free states and slave states) ; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 28
(discussing the heightened fears created by the westward expansion of the republic).
137. JACK N. RAKOVE , ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (1996) ; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 5.
138. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 32.
139. !d. at 32-33.
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thought Jefferson, Webster, and Rush, should be a system of
uniform schooling. 140 According to Rush, a system of uniform
schooling "will render the mass of people more homogeneous,
and thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceful
government." 141 Both Jefferson and Rush proposed systems of
state-administered schooling to serve this end, involving free
primary schools, grammar schools (similar to secondary
schools), state colleges, a university, and a library. 142 Along
with Jefferson and Rush, Washington also believed that the
federal government should establish and administer a national
university-graduation from which, Rush suggested, might be
required to serve in the federal government. 143 The view that
systematic schooling was necessary to promote homogeneity
and preserve the republic was widespread among the founding
generation. 144 David Tyack has referred to the view that
preserving liberty requires homogeneity as the "educational
paradox" of the founding generation. 145

3. Early plans for state education
The interest in a uniform system of schools brought with it
the first real plans for state control of education. 146 Thus,
contrary to the recent suggestions of several legal scholars, the
framers certainly did anticipate state-administered and state140. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 109-11; see also TYACK,
JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 23- 24.
141. BEN,JAMIN RUSH, ESSAYS, LITERARY , MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 7-8 (2d ed .
1806).
142. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 104, 109, 116-17. The inclusion
of secondary and post-secondary schooling shows that Jefferson (and Rush) believed
there to be a significant state interest in higher education , contrary to the suggestion of
the Supreme Court in Yoder. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226 n.14 ("[l]t is clear that, so far
as the mass of the people were concerned, [Jefferson] envisaged tha t a b asic education
in the 'three R's' would sufficiently meet the interests of the Sta te."). To be sure,
Jefferson did not state that such education should be mandatory.
143. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 37 (noting that the first six
Presidents of the United States all called for such a university); cf. THE NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 127 (observing that some founders believed that the
federal government did not h ave the power to establish a university).
144. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENC E, supra note 53, at 124- 25 (discussing a 1795
essay contest by the American Philosophical Society on education).
145. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 41.
146. In the 1630s, Massachusetts Bay established several schools (some of which
were supported in part by public funds) , founded Harvard, and famously required
households to teach basic skills, and towns over a certain population to maintain a
school; however , the mandatory education laws were rarely enforced. THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 14- 16, 180-88.
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funded school systems. 147 Plans put forward by Jefferson in
Virginia and Rush in Pennsylvania envisioned an increased
state presence in both school funding and curriculum. 148 For
example, Jefferson's plan divided Virginia into educational
"hundreds" or wards, and established a primary school in each
hundred. 149 Attending primary school was to be free and taxsupported for three years, and thereafter require payment of
tuition. 150 The curriculum would consist of reading, writing,
basic arithmetic, and history. 151 Some controls were placed on
textbooks (they had to teach history), and teachers were
appointed by "overseers," superintendent-like officials in
charge of ten schools. 152 Jefferson's bill also established twenty
higher grammar schools, to which tax-funded scholarships
would be available for the best primary school students
demonstrating need, and which would teach Latin and Greek,
English grammar, geography and advanced arithmetic. 153
Finally, scholarships would also be available for the best
grammar school students to attend college at William and
Mary. 154 Thus, Jefferson's bill included state taxes for
schooling, set primary and grammar school curricula and
restricted local control of textbooks and teacher hiring. In each
respect, the plan differed from the practices of schooling
dominant in America at the time . As Lawrence Cremin put it,
Jefferson's plan represented an effort to transfer control of
education outside the home from private religious
organizations (mostly churches) to state organizations, the
schools. 155 The state, thought Jefferson, was the most
14 7. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 217- 18 ("When America's tradition of
re li gious fairn ess got going, there were no public schools, and so the framers, not
surpris ingly, had nothing to say about how public education could sh ape young citize ns
for a society in which all are treated with equal respect."); DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note
55, at 56, 70- 71 ("If the fra mers had anticipated a forum in which the government
would state, promulgate, and embody American values while teaching children its
vers ion of the good life, they might have given constitutional attention to the role of
reli gion in s uch a context.").
148. For a brief de scription of the plans, see KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 8-9; THE
COLONIAL EXPI-:RIENCE, supra note 53, at 440; THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note
53, at 107-17.
149. A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, supra note 130, ~ 4.
150. Id. at ~I 6.
151. Id.
152. Id. at ~,1 6-7.
15a. Id . at
12-13 , 16.
154. Id. at ~ 19.
155. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 442.
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appropriate institution for imparting the kind of civic virtue
necessary for the republic to survive. 156
Virginia disagreed. Not seeing the need for such a system,
the Virginia Assembly rejected Jefferson's bill six times, and
Jefferson did not live to see the creation of a free primary
school system. 157 Resistance centered around the property
taxes required to fund the plan, as well as the alleged difficulty
of administering it. 158 In 1818, nearly thirty years after A Bill
for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge was first
introduced, the state finally created a system of free schooling,
but only for the poor. 159 This result was by no means unusual
for the time. Benjamin Rush's reform proposal suffered a
similar fate in Pennsylvania. 16 Coeval efforts by the state
legislature to mandate free schooling in Massachusetts went
unenforced; a law establishing local schools passed by the New
York legislature was underfunded and lasted only four
years. 161 While some states admitted to the Union at the turn
of the century, such as Ohio, Indiana and Mississippi, included
educational clauses in their state constitutions, the lang.uage
was rhetorical, hortatory, or merely announced a broad
educational purpose, without providing for specific school
regulations. 162 The only successful state regulation of education
occurred in Connecticut, where in 1795 the legislature created

°

156. ld.
157. The bill was rejected by the House in 1778; rejected by the House in 1780;
rejected by the Senate in 1785; rejected by the House in 1786; passed in a modified,
purely hortatory form, in 1796; and adopted in part and amended in part in 1818,
creating the University of Virginia. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at
107-12.
158. Id. at 108; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9.
159. THE NATIONAL EXPERI ENCE, supra note 53, at llO. Notably, other parts of
Jefferson's education plans were eventually realized . ld. at 112 ("By th e tim e of
Jefferson's death in 1826, a substantial portion of his program for education had come
to pass. The church h ad been disestablished ... ; a university had been found ed under
public auspices; and a press that had consistently extended its freedom ... was dai ly
performing its vital-if cacophonous-function of public enlightenment. But the great
library at Richmond had not been built .... More importantly, perhaps, the system of
free primary schools envisioned in the Bill for the More General Diffusion of
Knowledge had not beer. establis hed.").
160. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9.
161. Id. at 10.
162. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 30, 54- 55. See OHIO CONST. OF
1802, art. VIII, § 25; IND. CONST. OF 1816, art. IX; MISS. CONST. OF 1817, art. VI, § 16
("Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government, the
preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of
education, shall forever be encouraged in this State.").
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a permanent school fund with receipts from the sale of the
state's Western Reserve Territory. 163 The resultant fund
became so large that taxation proved unnecessary to support
local schools after 1820. 164 Elsewhere, the dreaded enemy of
the republic, localism, prevailed in the state legislatures. 165
The resistance these proposals faced is, in some respects,
unsurprising. After all, resistance to centralized control and
taxation were firmly entrenched in the American politics of the
revolutionary generation. 166 Local self-government was a
central part of political liberty-the liberty that republicans
believed education necessary to protect. 167 As Carl Kaestle put
it, "The very devotion to liberty that schooling was designed to
protect also made local citizens skeptical of new forms of
taxation by the state, and of new institutional regulation by the
central government." 168 Thus, the "republican" vision of a
common, state-administered school ran headlong into a concern
about liberty.
Importantly, it does not seem to have been a concern with
religious liberty that motivated the opposition. There is no
evidence that founding-era school opponents were moved by the
concerns that, as Michael McConnell has shown, led the
Baptists
and Presbyterians to support both state
disestablishment and eventually the federal Free Exercise
Clause. 169 This is despite the fact that some of the early school
proposals were expressly religious. Rush, for example,
recommended the use of the Bible to give moral instruction and
defended his school proposal on the grounds that it would be
beneficial to religion. 170 However , while the textual sources
proposed by Rush were religious, their significance was
primarily civic; as Rush conceived of public schooling, its
purpose was to educate future leaders, improve citizens,
homogenize the population, and encourage individuals to act in
ways that promoted the public good, rather than to

163 . l<A ESTLE, sup ra note 44, at 11.
164. l d .
165. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 443.
166. KAESTLE, supra not e 44, at 9.
167. ld.
168. ld.
169. See McConnell, sup ra note 57, at 1439- 43.
170. RUSH, sup ra note 108, at 1, 20- 21 , 82, 93-113 (describing the purpose of
educa tion).
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proseyltize.171 For the most part, the political struggle over
founding-era proposals for school reform seems to have focused
not on the religious content of the schools, but on who
controlled them: states or localities. 172
There were more mundane sources of opposition to school
plans as well. As David Tyack has argued, the Virginia planter
society took a very different attitude towards education than
did the religious communities of New England. 173 For planters
hoping to be gentlemen, formal instruction was a means of
polishing their character, and was of little utility to the
plantation agricultural economy. 174 Thus, it would not h ave
been in planters' interests to fund a state-administered
primary school system 175 Moreover, there was little agreement
about the best means of providing for education and whether
the existing institutions were sufficient. 176 In the latter- half of
the eighteenth century, schooling remained ancillary to the
education provided in the home and, to a declining extent, at
church. 177 What education demanded of the state was unclear.
Taken together, the opposition-including the principled
resistance to state taxes, the distrust of state government and
preference for local control, the cultural role of education in
Virginia in particular, and the doubtful necessity of state
administration in education-proved too formidable a political
barrier for the systematic educational reform that Jefferson
and Rush envisioned.
C. Educational Practices in the Early Republic
In contrast to Jefferson's grand plans, the educational
institutions dominant in the early republic were variegated and
highly local. 178 The vast majority of schooling took place
outside of urban centers. As the western edge of the country
expanded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, people left cities and America became more rural. In
1790, over ninety-five percent of Americans lived m
171. See THE NATIONAL E XPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 139; see infra Part III .
172. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53 , at 443; KAESTLE, supra note
44, at 9-10, 2 2.
173 . DAVID L. TYACK, TURNING POINTS IN AM ERICAN ED UCATIONAL HISTORY 3 4
(1967).
174. !d.
17 5. !d. a t 28-49.
176. TYACK, JAMES & B ENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 15.
177. See THE COLONIAL E XPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 480 , 4 9 1.
178 . TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 26.
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settlements of fewer than 2,500 people; by 1830, this was still
true of ninety-one percent of the population. 179 In rural settings
in the North and Midwest, the "district" school system
predominated. 180 District schools were usually one-room
clapboard houses built on unusable land, like a swamp or a
fallow field. 181 Children began attending school as young as two
or three years of age. 182 Discipline appears to have been the
primary focus for the youngest attendees, who were there
mostly to free up their parents; but other students enjoyed a
pedagogical mixture of rote memorization and copying
examples. 183 Generally, one teacher taught all of the pupils.
While they sometimes tried to separate children into classes
based on the difficulty of their textbooks, this was difficult
because families provided the textbooks, and they were often
different among students of the same level. 184 Using spellers
like Webster's or Thomas Dilworth's A New Guide to the
English Tongue, students first memorized the alphabet, then
strings of vowel-consonant syllables (like "ab, eb, ib, ob, ub")
and one-syllable words. 185 When students could read, they read
predominantly "authorized catechism"-selections from the Old
and New Testaments-as well as "lore, counsel, and rhyming
epigrams of a religious character." 186 The religious exercises
and the teaching of foreign language varied from district to
district, depending on majority preference. 187 Writing,
arithmetic, and geography were also taught. 188 Discipline
usually meant corporal punishment, which many teachers were
"harsh and frequent" in administering. 189
Funding was largely patchwork and varied from district to
distric.t. School districts in the North and Midwest were
financed in part by local property taxes, overhead and fuel

179. KAESTLE , supra n ot e 44, at 13.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 13-15.
182. Id. at 15- 16.
183. Id. at 17.
184. Id .
185. ld. at 16; THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 500-01.
186. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 501.
187. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 17.
188. ld. at 17; see also THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 501-05
(describing the approach to teaching arithmetic, the rule of threes, as well as providing
examples of the writing workbooks).
189. KAESTLE , supra note 44, at 13.
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contributions, tuition payments, and state aid. 190 In some
cases, teachers received their pay directly from patrons. 191
Federal land grants for financing primary education were
available to settlers in western states as early as the 1780s and
90s, but early on, the system was marred by waste,
mismanagement and corruption. 192 Schools in the South often
charged "subscription" rates to the families of attending
pupils. 193 In any case, the contemporary distinction between
private and public schools did not exist, and methods of
funding varied from community to community, depending on
the political culture and the circumstances. 194
Not only did localities effectively control curriculum and
funding, they also controlled teaching. Teaching in th.e late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was bad work. 195
School was in session for only ten weeks during the winter and
the summer, making it necessary for many teachers to find
other work during the breaks. 196 In most cases, pay was poor,
and turnover was high. Minimal training was required, and
indeed teachers usually arrived with no qualifications
whatsoever, sometimes only slightly better educated than their
students. 197 In New York, for example, "some local
communities had certified teachers who could not even add." 198
According to one school reformer, speaking in 1842, "at least
four fifths of the teachers in the common schools in Illinois
would not pass an examination in the rudiments of our English
education, and most of them [had] taken to teaching because
they hadn't anything in particular to do." 199 But, free from
state credentialing requirements or review, localities could hire
whichever teachers they wanted. 200 They exercised further
control by boarding teachers with local families . Families used
the opportunity not only to inquire, offer advice, and complain
about school, but to "monitor" teachers' personal lives as
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

ld.
THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 500.
See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 32, 38-40.
KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 13.
ld. at 13.
See id. at 20- 21.
ld. at 20.
ld.
ld. at 21.
ld.
ld. at 22.
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well. 201 Conditions were slightly different in the South, where
itinerant schoolmasters predominated. Sometimes, itinerant
teachers would arrive in town of their own accord, locate a
schoolhouse, solicit pupils, and set tuition rates; elsewhere in
the South, teachers were invited to town by parents to teach in
the local "old-field" school. 202 In all cases, however, parents in
the early republic had broad control over the hiring of teachers.
Parents used that control to select teachers whose religious
beliefs and native language matched their own, to help
maintain the cultural identity. 203 As a result, teachers did not
need credentials to provide rural districts with the services
they desired: rudimentary instruction and child care at a very
low cost. 204 And in fact, the rural district school system was
relatively well attended and the population enjoyed a high rate
of literacy. 205 Between 1750 and 1835, rural enrollmentsalready higher than those in urban schools-increased. 206
Much like rural schooling, urban schooling before the 1820s
involved a patchwork of different organizations, from boarding
schools, tutors, and independent pay schools, to "dame schools"
for young women, apprenticeship, and church charity
schools. 207 Most of the educational burden was met by the
independent pay schools. 208 These schools charged fees within
the reach of three-fourths of the city population, but tuition did
exclude members of the working poor, such as day laborers,
who could not afford the three to four dollar charge per
quarter. 209 Church charity schools, and later Sunday schools,
filled the gap. 210 The earliest church charity schools were
funded by donations and limited to children of the
congregation's members. 211 They taught rudimentary skills,
focusing primarily on literacy, the memorization of scripture,

201. Id.
202. Id. a t 13.
203. See id. at 17 (describing instruction in foreign la nguages and variations in
religiou s exercises).
204. Id. a t 20.
205. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 26; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at
24; see also THE COLONIAL EXPERJENCE, supra note 53, at 546.
206. l<AESTLE, supra note 44, at 27.
207. Id. a t 30- 31.
208. Id. a t 30, 52.
209. Id. a t 30, 53.
210. !d. a t 30-31.
211. !d. a t 31.
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and the morality of the denomination. 212 As city populations
began to grow at the turn of the century, however, charity
schools began to reach beyond the confines of their own
congregation to the city poor. 213 The voluntary associations,
common in America at the time, played a large role in
extending charity school services, using a combination of tax
revenue and donations.214 In Philadelphia, for example , the
Society for the Free Instruction of Female Children opened a
school for poor girls in 1796.215 A similar group, the Female
Association, opened a girls' school in New York in 1801. 216
Women were well represented in the educational voluntary
associations, as were Quakers. Quakers dominated the New
York Manumission Society, which opened a school for black
children in 1787. 217 Quakers also established the New York
Free School Society in 1805, with the explicit aim to provide
education for the city's poor on a much larger scale. 218
Employing the innovative Lancasterian pedagogy, in which
older students taught younger students, the Free School
Society was able to educate hundreds of students in its
school. 2 19 Nevertheless, until the 1830s, the independent pay
schools continued to serve more children than the charity
schools.220
The ideology of the charity schools was very different from
that of the rural district schools and the urban independent
pay schools. Whereas the district schools were controlled
primarily by parents, who hired teachers, provided textbooks,
and determined how long children would remain in attendance,
charity schools were controlled by trustees, who sought to
interpose the school between the the child and the parent. 22 1
According to Kaestle, charity schools were in fact "antagonistic

21 2. ld. at 3 1~3 2.
213. ld. at 32.
214. !d. at 40.
215. !d.
21 6. Id. at 3 1~32.
217. By 1810, "African free schools" s pread to cities in New J er sey, Rhode Island
and Delaware. l d . a t 38.
218. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 40.
219. S ee id. at 4 0~4 1.
220. ld. at 52.
221. ld. at 39, 55 ("Unlike rural district schooling, urb al charity schooling wa s
designed t o intervene between par ents and children , to introduce children to a cultu re
and morality that r efor mers believed was different tha n their pa rents.").
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to the child's family and peer influences."222 Charity school
trustees took this attitude because they believed poverty was a
moral failing and that poor parents had become poor because of
their bad character. They feared that, if left unaddressed,
parents would impart character and habits to their children ,
who would remain impoverished.223 As the New York Daily
Adve rtiser suggested in 1791, the poor "seldom keep any
government in their families ," and their children "unavoidably
contract habits of idleness and mischief and wickedness."224
Widespread poverty would in turn generate the crime, social
tension , and political disaffection increasingly characteristic of
the cities .225 The solution was to break the cycle by replacing
the influence of parents' influence with the morality of the
church .226
It was from the church-operated city charity schools that
the America n common school system developed. Common
school reformers altered the republican theory of education by
drawing on the ideas of the Second Great Awakening,
tra nsforming an education in public virtue to instruction in
Protestant morals. In the 1830s, 40s and 50s, vast numbers of
immigra nt Catholics arrived in American cities. They objected
to a progr a m of moral education that was, in effect, Protestant.

III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON SCHOOLS

Although Jefferson and Rush's plans ultimately failed, the
balance struck by state legislatures in favor of locally
controlled schools and against free school systems was not
222. l d . (e mph asis a dded).
223. Id. a t 32.
224 . NF:W YOR K DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 27, 1791, quoted in KAESTLE, supra n ote
44, a t 32; Horace Ma nn, On Childhood in the Cities and the Fatherhood of God, in
TURNING P OINTS IN AMERICAN E DUCATIONAL HISTORY 134-135 (D avid Tyack ed., 1967)
("And as I see t he poor a nd neglected child ren in the streets , or in th eir own wretched
h ouses, a nd how t hey li ve and grovel in low pra ctices, gra dually losing t he sweet
innoce nce of infantile ex pression , a nd beco ming coarse a nd violent , even br utal, I
wonder still a t the tor pidity of society upon thi s subject . . .. The sort of education t hey
get in cities, where life is stirr ing briskly around them, and each one seems scr a mbling
to get t he best morsel for himself, only ma kes the m worse, unless something is done to
evoke ord er for the m out of this chaos.") .
225. KA F:STLE, sup ra note 44, at 32-33, 36 (notin g tha t leader s "jus tified charity
schoolin g on groubds of stability") .
226. Id. at 32- 33, 39 ("Educa tion would h elp reduce crim e and vice while it muted
cultura l differe nces"); id. a t 4 7 ("One of t he central goals of ch a rity-sch ool worker s was
t o r escue chil dren from a n allege dly harmful family environment.").

304

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

immutable. Legislators' votes reflected, in part, a judgment
that a state system was unnecessary, since the hodgepodge of
district schools, itinerant schoolmasters, private tutors, and
independent pay schools were doing the job.227 However, the
assumptions on which this judgment rested proved unstable.
Social circumstances were changing, and as they changed, they
upset the judgment that state schooling was unnecessary. Two
of these changes are especially significant.
A. Westward Expansion and the Birth of Federal School
Regulation

First, westward expansion dramatically increased in the
nineteenth century. Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio were
admitted to the Union at the turn of the century; one year after
Ohio became a state, the Louisiana Purchase vastly increasd
the size of the country. 228 Over the next sixty years, seventeen
states joined the Union. 229 The climate, geography, and
resources of these new interior western states differed from the
eastern states. Their economies differed as well; the West
became an agricultural region (like the South), while, by the
1840s, the Northeast had transformed into a manufacturing
region. 230 In addition, some of the people who settled the West
were very different from the dominant ethnic and cultural
groups of the eastern states. In the upper Midwest, for
example, Wisconsin was settled in large part by German
Catholics and Lutherans, some of whom immigrated together
as entire communities and exhibited a strong interest in
preserving their native language and culture. 231 These
immigrants constituted a large portion of the state. By 1890,
thirty-seven percent of Wisconsin's population was either born
in Germany or had one parent born there. 232 Together with the

227. Id. at 9.
228. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 56; notably, the Louisian a
Purchase was initially regarded as illega l by Spain and Britia n , and was not
acknowledged until 1819. HOWE, supra note 54, at 16, 108.
229. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 56.
230. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 63 .
23 1. See Thomas C. Hunt, The Bennett Law of 1890: Focus of Conflict Between
Church and State in Education, 23 J. CHURCH & ST. 69, 84- 85 (198 1).
232. ld. at 85 (citin g U.S. IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, REPORTS OF THE
IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: STATISTICAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION, 1820-1910 DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS, 1850-1900 522 (Washington, D.C.: Gove rnment Printing
Office 1911) [hereinafter IMMIGRATI ON].

2]

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND STATE REGULATION

305

Irish, English and other immigrant populations, seventy-four
percent of Wisconsin was either foreign-born or had at least
one foreign-born parent. Wisconsin's immigrant population was
considerable, but hardly extreme at the time; in 1890, the state
ranked third in the number of eligible voters from foreign
countries. 233
The differences between the expanding West and East
raised old worries about obedience, loyalty, and mutual
understanding between citizens and federal leadership in
Washington. 234 In response, both federal and state
governments began to place more emphasis on schooling.
Uniform school systems teaching a standard curriculum would
impart American virtues and the English language, effectively
homogenizing the next generation. 235 Fully "Americanized," the
new immigrant groups would feel greater loyalty to the union.
As the U .S. House Committee on Public Lands put it in 1826,
when it recommended that half of all proceeds from the sale of
public lands go to funding common schools, education
"improve[s] . . . the minds and morals of the present
generation, and of generations to come"-an important task
because it "contemplates giving additional stability to the
government, and drawing round the republic new and stronger
bonds of union." 236 So justified, all citizens had an interest in
building in their states uniform systems of common schools for
all children.
The emphasis placed on schooling had legal ramifications at
both the federal and state levels. At the federal level, land
grants for public schooling became more common and better
administered as the century progressed. 237 School land grants
had been part of the township system since the federal Land
Ordinance of 1785, under which "lot 16" of a township was to
be used "for the maintenance of public schools." 238 Article III of
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also "encouraged" the citizens
of the territory to establish "schools and the means of
education." 239 Nevertheless, before the turn of the century,
23 3. ld. (citing IMMIGRATION, supra note 232, at 471).
234. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 28.
235. Jd. at 28-29.
236. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUULLC L ANDS, 1826 REPORT, quoted in TYACK, JAMES

& BENAVOT, supra no te 41, at 28.
237. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 2 1- 22.
238. Jd. at 31.
239. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III.
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school land grants were sometimes omitted, "mismanaged or
squandered." 240 At first, Congress viewed school land grants as
bargaining chips to induce western settlement; when buyers
failed to request them, Congress sometimes omitted the
grants. 241 Even when school grants were provided, few federal
restrictions were imposed on their use, and the resources were
often diverted to uses other than schooling. 242 Townships ,
trying to decide whether to rent or sell the property, discovered
that renters had little incentive to improve the property and
that immediate sale of the land was often for very little
money. 243
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, this system
had transformed in several important ways. Land buyers
began to view public school grants as entitlements, and
expected Congress to provide them in all sales. 244 In 1848,
Congress in fact increased the amount of land for schools from
one lot to two lots, setting aside "5.5% of the public domain" in
California for education. 245 Congress began to provide new
states with cash grants in addition to land, reserving a portion
of proceeds from the sale of the public domain for use in state
common school funds. 246 Administrative controls also evolved.
In 1847, the Commissioner of Public Lands issued instructions
detailing lawful means for selecting, registering and selling
federal land grants for schools. 247 The agency also began to
hear and decide land grant disputes, as did the federal
courts. 248 Finally, Congress used gifting of the federal domain
as a bargaining chip to implement policies it could not enact
directly. 249 Conditional land grants enabled the federal
government to achieve changes in school policy at the state
level, as well.
Changes at the state level were felt first in constitutions,
whose educational provisions grew in the nineteenth century
from largely ineffectual rhetorical flourishes into explicit
240. TYACK, J AMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , a t 2 1.
24 1. Id. at 32 .

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

247.
248.
249.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. a t
Id.
Jd. at

38-40.
40-41.
34.

37.
33.
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controls on the use and sale of federal public land grants. 250 By
the second half of the nineteenth century, education
regulations burgeoned, and states began to systematically
regulate schooling. To understand this development, however,
we need to consider a second major social change in the early
nineteenth century United States.

B. Urbanization and the Common School Movement
1. Immigration and the growth of the city
The second social change that helped to tilt the balance in
favor of state-administered school systems was the growth of
the American city. 251 The growth of the city itself encompassed
a cluster of changes, but most important was the dramatic
increase in immigration between the 1820s and 1870s, in
particular the immigration of Catholics from Ireland and
Germany. 252 Catholics had not previously constituted a large
segment of the population. In 1765, for example, there were
approximately 25,000 Catholics in the English colonies, whose
total population was around two million. 253 Given the historical
animosity between English Protestants and Catholics and the
severe restrictions placed on Catholics by some colonial
governments, this number is unsurprising. However, between
the 1820s and 1850s, over two million Catholics arrived in the
United States. 254
Many of these immigrants arrived very poor and illiterate,
and some did not speak English at all. They differed ethnically
and culturally from earlier American immigrants. 255 The Irish
Catholics settled mostly in cities, 256 including Boston, New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and further west in Detroit, St.

250. Id. at 55.
251. DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 58 (2005); HOWE, supra note 54, at 454
("What proba bly tipped the scales in favor of states assuming some responsibility for
educa tion was the growth of cities and towns .").
252. TIMOTHY WALCH, PARISH SCHOOL: AMERICAN PAROCHIAL EDUCATION FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 12 (1996).
253. Id.
254. See DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 265-66 (discussing Irish immigration);
cf WALCH, supra note 252, at 23 (putting total Catholic immigration around 5 million
for this period)
255. WALCH, supra note 252, at 24.
256. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 376.

308

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

Louis, Cincinnati and Chicago. 257 There they met many nonimmigrant families who had also recently come to the city,
especially in the Northeast. Those born in America were drawn
to the cities by the same factory jobs that attracted
immigrants, and relocation to the city was made easier by
recent advances in transportation infrastructure. 258 Together
these forces filled the cities and altered national demographics.
Between 1830 and 1860, the number of people living in cities of
more than 2,500 grew from less than ten percent of the
population to about twenty percent, 259 rapidly increasing the
population density of these areas. The increase in population
density in turn served to heighten the problems of the cityclass and ethnic tension, poverty, disease, crime-and placed a
severe strain on what social services existed. 260
Catholic immigration to the cities heightened old worries
about social stability. 261 In part, this was simply due to the
sheer number of immigrants and the effect of increased
population density on city life. 262 Many immigrants arrived in
the country impoverished, placing an immediate strain on
hospitals, almshouses, and the system of charity schools
administered by churches and voluntary associations. 263 But
more significantly, the Catholic immigrants of the 1820s-1870s
were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically different from
previous immigrants and from the population as a whole. 264
This newfound diversity triggered a number of reactions,
including discord, discrimination, and outright violence

257. Many German Catholic families settled in the country, although later German
immigrants came to Milwaukee, St. Louis and Chicago. Chinese immigrants in the
1860s and 1870s settled mostly in the far west. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra
note 53, at 376.
258. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 69.
259. ld. at 63.
260. See id. at 70 ("Population density in large cities increased tensions and made
social problems more visible.").
261. See id. at 79-80 ("Americans of the 1830s and 1840s inherited from the
revolutionary generation an anxious sense of the fragility of republican government .. .
. [T]here were new forces to fea r ... manufacturing, foreign immigration, the decline of
landholding, the fragmenta tion of Protestant r eligion, and the growth of cities.").
262. Id. at 70 (discussing this issue separately).
263. See id.
264. ld. at 71-72 ("The presence of so many culturally alien people in antebellum
America greatly reinforced the use of emerging public school systems to teach children
a common English language and a common Protestant morality, much as earlier
charity schools had been directed at those qualities of blacks or poor whites that
educational reform ers saw as undesireable or threatening.").
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between immigrants and the American-born. 265
Discord in the cities proved a fertile ground for common
school proposals. Drawing on republican theories of education,
school reformers emphasized that a uniform system of schools
would remove cultural conflict. 266 "Common schools" open to all
would assimilate new immigrants and resolve potential
divisions before they occurred. School thus presented a
"peaceful and seemingly democratic solution" to the social
threat posed by the new influx of immigrants. 267 According to
Horace Mann, appointed in 1837 to be Secretary of the newly
created Massachusetts Board of Education, the common school:
is capacious enough to receive and cherish in its parental
bosom every child that comes into the world; and ... [offers]
seasonable supplies of counsel and guidance making security
antedate danger. Other social organizations are curative and
r emedial; this is a preventive and an antidote; they come to
heal diseases and wounds; this is to make the physical and
moral frame invulnerable to them. Let the common school be
expanded to its capabilities, let it be worked with the
efficiency of which it is susceptible, and nine tenths of the
crimes in the penal code would become obsolete; the long
catalogue of human ills would be abridge; men would walk
more safely by day; every pillow would be more inviolable by
night; property, life, and character held by stronW tenure; all
rational hopes respecting the future brightened. 26

Mann's belief that common schools would "kindle a spirit of
amity and mutual respect that the conflicts of adult life could
never destroy" is a recognizable extension of the republican
view that common, institutionalized education would
homogenize the population and thereby generate the obedience,
loyalty and mutual understanding necessary for the survival of
a large republic. 269 Yet, the public received Mann's theory with
different ears than had the founding generation. Whereas
earlier American generations did not see the need for a

2 65. See, e.g., WALCH, supra note 252, at 26; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 72.
266. THE N ATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 138; KAESTLE, supra note, at 72

(noting th at Protestants of the time, like Americans of other generations, "looked to
public education to resolve cultural conflict.").
267. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 72.
268. HORACE MANN, COMMON SCHOOL JOURNAL, III 15 (1841), quoted in THE
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 137.
269. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 99; THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at
138; see also KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 69- 70, 80.
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common school system, the influx of immigrants and the
growth of the city made Americans of the early nineteenth
century more receptive.

2. Religion and the common school movement
Common school reformers also drew on the language and
self-understanding of the contemporary religious revival in
making their case. 270 This is an essential difference between
the common school movement and earlier plans for school
reform. For example, where Jefferson and Rush believed that
an education in public virtue was necessary to preserve
republican government, Mann believed that it should be the
schools' mission to impart moral rectitude. 271 The American
Revolution, thought Mann, removed many political restraints
on conduct. A moral reformation would be required to preserve
the resulting system; without it, unchecked "human passion"
would create anarchy and suffering. 272 Where Jefferson had
described schooling's goal as imparting public virtue, or a
disposition to promote the common good, Mann's descriptions
were shot through with the Protestantism of the Second Great
Awakening. 273 As Lawrence Cremin describes it, "Mann's
definition of what should be taught came remarkably close to
the evangelical conceptions of the day-a common piety rooted
in Scripture, a common civility revolving around the history
and the state documents of a Christian Republic, and a
common intellectual culture .... "274 Such an orientation was
widespread among common school reformers-some of whom
were ministers themselves. 275 Teachers, the reformers argued,
270. For a discussion of the Second Great Awakening, see generally HOWE, supra
note 54.
271. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 136, 138; KAESTLE, supra note
44, at 82.
272. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 138-39.
273. Id. at 136-37, 139 ("In essence, Mann accepted th e propositions of the
republican st yle of educational thought and reca st them in the form s of nineteenth·
centu ry nondenominational Protestantism.") . Ma ny of the urb a n common school
reformers of the time associated their work with millennia lism as well. S ee KAESTLE,
supra note 44, at 49, 94-95.
274. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 140; see also WALCH, supra
note 252, at 26.
275. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 96-99; see David Tyack, The Kingdom of God and

the Common School: Protestant Ministers and the Educational Awakening in the West,
36 HARV. ED. REV. 447, 447 (1966) ("Across the nation, but especially in the new
communities of the west, ministers accepted the founding and superintendence of
schools as a traditional religious duty.").
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had a duty to impart the common Protestant morals of selfcontrol, deference, honesty, industry, frugality, and respect for
private property and traditional family roles .276
One result of the focus on Protestantism among school
reformers was a strong and sometimes VICIOUS antiCatholicism. 277 Of course, anti-Catholicism was not uncommon
in America at the time. According to a popular Boston minister,
for example, the Catholic church was "the ally of tyranny, the
opponent of material prosperity, the foe of thrift, the enemy of
the railroad, the caucus, and the school."278 But as Kaestle has
shown, anti-Catholicism played a large role in the ideology of
common
school
reformers , who
regarded American
Protestantism as being naturally superior. 279 In the eyes of
many reformers, Protestants were responsible for the economic
progress and political liberty the nation enjoyed, and only
Protestant values should be taught in the schools.280
Common school reformers did attempt to remain neutral
between Protestant denominations. Some of the strongest
resistance to common school reform came from Protestants
themselves. 281 Denominations had multiplied during the
Second Great Awakening, and minority denominations were
concerned that the doctrine of other denominations might be
taught as part of the common school moral curriculum. As
Noah Feldman has observed, this created a dilemma for Mann
and the other reformers: without religion, school would not
276. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 98 ("If the chief purpose of public common
schooling was moral education, and if moralit y had to be grounded in reli gion, there
had to be some way to h ave religion in the schools.") .
277. Catholicism was associated with "degener acy and r uin." ld. at 93.
278. ld.
279. Id. at 92-93.
280. On the role of religion in public schools, it is useful t o contrast Mann with
earlier school reformers, like Jefferson. Unlike Mann, Jefferson did not think common
schooling and religious uniformity had to go hand in hand. He viewed his school reform
proposals in the Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge as complementary t o
the guarantees of religious liberty in the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom .
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, § II (1779). As is well
known , the latter bill barred compulsion in matters of conscience, as well as r estraints
and burdens on account of one's religious beliefs. ld. As Jefferson understood things,
r eligious freedom was consistent with school reform because school reform aimed to
foster public virtue, not the morals of a particular denomination, and a system of
schools would impart the knowledge a nd sensibility with which individuals could freely
arrive at sectarian religious commitments on their own. See THE COLONIAL
EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 442 . In contrast, common school reformers envisoned
schools as compelling certain religious beliefs and dampening others.
281. DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 62-63.
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have its moral content; but religious doctrine would create
denominational strife. 282 The solution to the conflict was the
program of "non-denominationalism" or "non-sectarianism." 283
While denominations had doctrinal differences, they united on
core moral commitments, and these were the kinds of
commitments that school should impart. 284 Mann believed that
these commitments could be imparted by reading the Bible
without any accompanying commentary. 285 Reading the Bible
without any comment would permit a student to judge the
Bible "according to the dictates of his own reason and
conscience." 286
The significance of non-sectarianism, however, can be
overstated. Non-sectarianism excluded the millions of Catholics
who had recently arrived in the country. 287 More importantlyand essential to understanding the common school system-is
that interference with the practice of minority religions was an
aim of the common school system. 288 The movement for
common school reform was driven by anxiety over the newly
arrived, diverse immigrants. The common-school solution to
this anxiety was to assimilate the immigrants. Thus, the
common schools were not intended to protect liberty of
conscience or promote religious diversity, but to counteract
them. 289 In this way, the common schools were a recognizable
extension of traditional republicanism, with its focus on public
virtue and homogeneity. 290 Only this view accounts for the fact
that it was the Catholic opponents of the common school
movement, not the proponents, who emphasized the
importance of religious liberty_2 91
These social changes-immigration, the growth of cities,
and religious revivalism-combined with technological
developments to give school reform proposals increased

282. ld. at 60-61.
283. ld. at 61.
284. ld.
285. ld.
286. ld. at 61-62.
287. See DIVIDED BY Goo, supra note 55, at 63-65.
288. See, e.g. , KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 163-64.
289. See id. at 63-64.
290. As Michael McConnell has shown, traditional republicanism was opposed to
the movement for religious liberty by minorities during the Virginia a ssessment
controversy. McConnell, supra note 57, at 1437.
291. See infra Part IV.
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traction throughout the country. The primary effect of
t echnological change was to bring distant parts of the country
closer together. For example, as advances in communication
and transportation cut down on rural insularity, the threat of
instability perceived in the cities was perceived in rural regions
as well. 292 Rural regions began to take economic interest in
manufacturing regions. The development of an interregional
system for the transportation of foodstuffs increased rural
concern with the arithmetic and literacy necessary to
part1c1pate
in
the
market. 293
Evangelizing
state
superintendents like Mann and John Pierce of Michigan "rode
circuit" across their states, lecturing to audiences about the
importance of state-regulated free school systems. 294 They
framed their claims for the importance of state schooling using
the shared language of the contemporary religious movement.
Together, these forces led to a series of changes in schooling
practices, of which three are important here: the institution of
attendance requirements, the rise of state educational agencies
and officers, and the decline of "private" schools. 295

3. Changes in education policy
First, attendance requirements were probably the least
important of the common school reforms. 296 The available
evidence suggests that, at the time of reform, a large majority
of eligible children in some states attended school at least
sometime during the year. By 1850, around fifty percent of the
children under the age of twenty attended school during the
year in Massachusetts, New York, Michigan and Wisconsin. 297
Considering that children under five and over fifteen typically
did not attend school, the attendance rate was likely
considerably greater than fifty percent of the target age
range. 298 Of course, these states were educational leaders, and
many other states did not reach similar enrollment figures.
292. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 66.
293. See HOWE, supra note 54, at l, 5-6; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 63- 64.
294. 'l'HE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 136; KAESTLE, sup ra note 44, at
157.
295. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 106, 111, 116.
296. See id. at 106 ("These data support what is apparent from the reformers' own
statements-that enrollment was not the cen t ral concern of the common-school
mov ement .") .
297. !d.
298. !d. at 106- 07.
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Figures for Pennsylvania and New Jersey put enrollments at
around twenty percent in 1840 and forty percent in 1860. 299
When school reformers did focus on attendance, their concern
was not with general enrollments but with particular groups,
such as child workers, the children of freed slaves, and the
perpetually truant. 30 Child labor interfered with education
mostly in immigrant communities, where many families
needed income from an additional worker. Working conditions
were often extreme, and children worked the same shifts a s
their parents. 301 In their familiar way, reformers argued that it
damaged the nation's interests for children to go morally
uninstructed. In some cases they succeeded in securing the
passage of state legislation requiring education for factory
children, or, in the latter half of the century, prohibiting child
labor altogether. Many of these statutes, however, went
unenforced. 302
The second major category of state regulation achieved by
common school reformers is the development of state
educational agencies and officers. The first of these r eform s
was the development of state boards of education and state
superintendents. Many of the common school reformers were
appointed to these leadership positions: Horace Mann in
Massachusetts and Henry Barnard in Connecticut led their
state boards of education; John Peirce was the first state
superintendent in Michigan. 303 The power of these positions
was at first quite minimal, confined to gathering data on
educational practices in the state. 304 Where state
superintendents were given larger powers, such as h earing
appeals in educational disputes, local officials often failed to
comply with their orders. 305 Nevertheless, these early leaders
appear to have had a strong influence, at least in some states,
on the development of state educational authority. This
influence came not from their statutory power, but from the
power of their personalities and their extended popular
campaigns for school reform. Horace Mann was particularly

°
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300.
301.
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ld. at 106.
Id. a t 107.
See id. at 107·08.
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respected; a later state superintendent referred to him as the
"Puritan of Puritans," and claimed that Mann was "born to be a
champion."306
State officials used their persuasive power to press for
legislation increasing state control over education. Some of
these efforts were successful, and some were not. 307 Most states
created state school funds, and, as discussed above, provided
for the deposit of federal land grant receipts into those funds. 308
Many states also pushed for an office of county
superintendents, who would interpret state education laws,
ensure reports were made to state agencies, encourage
uniformity of textbooks, and examine the qualifications of
teaching candidates. 309 The office of county superintendents
was a controversial innovation, and their implementation and
authority were limited in many instances. Textbook reform also
proved challenging, in part because some parents resisted
replacing family textbooks with state or county-recommended
books.3 10 Textbook uniformity was not widely achieved until
school districts began to purchase texts themselves, in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. 311 These developments
were piecemeal; reformers, however, were concerned with
providing the kind of uniformity that only state regulation
could accomplish, since uniformity would improve the
consistency of school quality 312 and promote the interest in
assimilating
diverse
communities. 313
With
extensive
campaigning, they achieved many of their goals by the 1890s,
when most states had in place state boards, state and county
superintendents, school funds, and control over teacher hiring,
subjects taught, and textbooks. 314
The final category of change in this period was the decline
of "private" schools. This point has to be made with some care,
since the contemporary distinction between private and public
schools did not exist until sometime in the middle of the
eighteenth century. Before this time, schools were financed by
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 114.
See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 55.
Id.
KAESTLE. supra note 44, at 115.
See id. at 134.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 71 , 156-57.
See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 59.
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a variety of sources. In the cities, independent pay schools and
academies, which charged tuition, also received public money,
as did religious charity schools. 3 15 Rural district schools were
financed by a combination of property tax revenue and
quarterly fees. 316 This began to change during the time of
common school reform, and a public school-private school
distinction crystallized. 3 !7
School reformers believed that common schools could only
provide the promised social and moral benefits if all children
attended them. If a large number of children attended private
schools, or if parents of a particular cultural group or class
educated their children in schools for them alone, society would
lose the mutual understanding that common schooling could
produce. 318 Since common schools would have to be free to
enable all to attend, the effort to bring everyone into free
common schools took the form of an attack on "private" and
religious schools. This attack took different forms. Rhetorically,
reformers began to characterize private and religious schools as
"not republican." 319 Most interestingly, however, was the
development in funding. New York is illustrative of funding
changes that occurred in cities. In the 1820s, independent pay
schools educated the majority of children in New York. 320 In
1825, however, the New York Free School Society, which ran
the largest charity school in the city, convinced the city council
that public funds should not be distributed to denominational
schools. 321 This cut funding to charity schools run by the
Baptists and Catholics, severely limiting the ability of these
schools to serve their communities. The Free School Society
then became the "Public School Society," and opened its doors
to everyone, not only the poor.322 In 1832, attendance became
free for all.323 This strategy drew students who would have
gone to denominational charity schools and to independent pay
schools. In fact, by 1850 the percentage of students attending
315. S ee KAESTLE, supra note 44 , a t 51, 57, 119; see also TYACK, J AMES &
BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 26.
316. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 13 .
317. Id . at 117.
318. ld. at 116.
319. ld. (quoting Orville Taylor) .
320. Id .
321. ld. at 118.
322. Id . at 116.
323. ld. at 57- 58.
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private schools in New York had fallen from sixty-two percent
in 1829 to eighteen percent. 324 In rural regions, common school
reformers accomplished the same end by attacking "rate bills,"
which district schools used to charge parents tuition for
attendance. 325 Most northern states abolished rate bills by the
middle of the nineteenth century. 326 The only schools to
successfully resist these attacks were the more expensive
private academies. 327 Even though common schools were now
open to all, their charity school history did not immediately
wear off, discouraging many wealthy families from sending
their children to them. 32 8
It was thus a change in circumstances, rather than a
profound shift in educational theory, that precipitated the
development of free common schools during the antebellum
period. Republican concerns about the expanse of the country,
cultural homogeneity and loyalty, and the necessity of a
normative education remained important. To be sure, there
were important changes in the educational theories of
reformers. The rhetoric of school reformers crossed the
boundary-if such a boundary can be maintained-between an
emphasis on homogeneity and an emphasis on assimilating the
alien.329 Jefferson's education in public virtue was replaced by
an education in Protestant morals, and American PanProtestantism became firmly implanted in the common school
curriculum. 330 More significant than this theoretical drift were
the social and economic changes occuring in the country. Waves
of immigration, the rise of cities, industrialization, and
westward expanse all heightened traditional republican
anxieties, to which school systems had been proposed as a
solution. The development of markets, the construction of
transportation infrastructure, and increased communication

324. !d. a t 116.
325. !d. a t 117.
326. !d.
327. Id. at 117- 118.
328. !d. at 118.
329. Compare id . at 163 (describing the then- contemporary view of school a s a
"filter" to "cleanse" immigrants) , with THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at
117 (1980) (describing the concern with homogeneity among the found er s). This
di stinction remain s difficult and vitall y importa nt to draw today. See Ginger
Thompson, Wh ere Education and Assimilation Collide, N.Y. TIM ES, Mar. 14, 2009, at
Al.
330. See supra note 280 and accompanying discussion.
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connected rural areas to the cities, helping to overcome the
political localism that defeated earlier school reforms.
Taken together, these social and economic changes made
school reform politically possible where it had proved
impossible for Jefferson and Rush. Pro-reform Federalists and
then Whigs were able to overcome the generally anti-reform
Democrats, both at federal and state levels. 33 1 The result was
the development of a state regulatory apparatus which had, at
the time, "by far the largest number of employees and the
biggest budget of any activity of government in peacetime." 332
David Tyack has described public education in the nineteenth
century as the "fourth branch of state government." 333 As we
have already seen, this so-called "fourth branch" had a strong
religious character.
IV. CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND PARENTAL RIGHTS

A. Public School Curriculum and Catholic School Financing

While common school reformers, including Horace Mann,
sought to establish a common school system with a noncontroversial "Christian" curriculm, 334 the result in most cases
was a "non-sectarian" or "non-denominational" Protestant
education, emphasizing the pan-Protestant values of industry,
thrift, self-control, private property, and traditional family
roles. 335 Both Catholic communities and Protestant
communities found much to object to in this curriculum. 336
1. Public schools and the King James Bible

The most intractable of the curricular disputes famously
concerned the use of the King James Bible. 337 Since its

331. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 45-46, 53; see generally
KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 148-58.
332. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 45.
333. !d. at 44.
334. S ee KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 80; TYACK, JAMES & B ENAVOT, supra note 41,

at 162.
335. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 93.
336. ld. at 158; WALCH, supra note 252, at 26- 30; see JOAN D ELFATTORE, TH E
FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15 (2 004).
337. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 21 , 34; WALCH, supra note 252, at 40-45;
KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 168; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 163- 64.
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appearance 200 years earlier, the King James Version had
338
. "t h e Icon
.
been, as Joan Delfattore put It,
of p ro t es t an t"Ism. "
Its content bore the marks of denominational struggle. For
example, the version in use during the 1840s referred to the
Pope as "the man of Sinne," and expressly rejected papal
authority. It attributed to the Catholic Church responsibility
for the previous suppression of comprehendible translations
and accused it of working to obscure religious truth. Perhaps
more importantly, the King James Version contained no
textual commentary, whereas Catholics believed that scripture
should be accompanied with an authoritative commentarysomething that the Catholic Douay Bible contained. 339 Thus,
when school boards made concessions allowing for the use of
any Bible without commentary, they were not "concessions"
designed to appease the Catholics. 340 As the Catholics saw it,
reading the Bible without commentary was not non-sectarian,
but a "Protestant concept" and "was more dangerous than no
[biblical] education at all." 341
Some Catholic parents demanded that their children be
permitted to opt-out of reading the King James Bible, but this
request was not always granted. Even where school districts
asserted that children could opt-out, the procedure was not
often enforced. Rumors circulated of unsympathetic teachers
demanding compliance, whipping and humiliating students
who protested to reading King James. 342 Nor was the King
James Bible the sole curricular conflict between Protestants
and Catholics. Besides Bible reading, a school day often
included Protestant hymns, the Lord's prayer, and the Ten
Commandments-a slightly different list of commandments for
Catholics and Protestants. School textbooks contained ethnic
and religious slurs, as well as blunt dismissals of Catholicism
and the Catholic Church. 343 The entire curriculum of the
common schools-as was consistent with the ideology of
common school reform-reflected a reflexive belief in the
superiority of American Protestantism and the necessity of its

338. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 21.
339. S ee id. at 34-35.
340. S ee KAESTLE, supra note 44 , at 169 (noting Catholic opposition to such a
practice).
341. WALCH, supra note 253, at 28.
342. See DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 33-35.
343. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 222.
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dominance to the survival of the republic. 344
Disputes over the bible led to violence in Philadelphia in
1844. 345 In an effort to prevent local school personnel from
engaging in sectarian instruction, Philadelphia school officials
issued a resolution prohibiting the introduction of religious
material into the curriculum, unless approved by the school
board. 346 The board then proceeded to only approve the use of
the King James Bible.347 The Irish Bishop of Philadelphia,
Francis Patrick Kenrick, wrote a letter to the school board
requesting that Catholic children be permitted to read from the
Douay Bible and exempted from reciting the Lord's prayer. 348
The school board responded that no child would be forced to
read from the King James Version. 349 Mter Catholic parents
reported that children were still being forced to read the Bible
and punished for non-compliance, Bishop Kenrick formally
complained to the school board and asked again that Catholic
children be permitted to read from Douay. 350 This time, the
school board responded by allowing children to read from "any
Bible without note or comment"-ruling out the Douay-but
also established penalties for teachers who forced children to
read from King James.35l
Angry nativists spread the word that Catholics were trying
to exclude Bible reading from schools altogether-a tactic not
uncommon at the time. 352 They characterized the complaints as
evidencing a Catholic plan to subvert the will of the majority to
the commands of the Catholic Church. 353 As nativists began to
campaign for popular support in an upcoming election, they
staged rallies in Philadelphia neighborhoods heavily populated
by Irish. Residents attacked the rallies. On May 6, two
thousand nativists rallied in Kensington, an Irish
neighborhood north of Philadelphia. 354 While they were seeking
cover from a rainstorm, a Protestant boy was shot; a riot
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

350.
35 1.
352.
353.
354.

See id. at 92-93.
!d. at 170.
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erupted, with Catholics shooting from the rooftops and
Protestants smashing windows and breaking down doors .355
The n ext day, three thousand nativists marched to Kensington,
where they again fought residents and burned homes; the next
day, two Catholic churches were burnt, despite efforts by city
officials to intervene. 356 Order was restored only after residents
of the St. Augustine neighborhood-well-to-do Protestantsorganized informal peacekeeping groups and patrolled. 357
In the end, disputes between Catholics and Protestants
over Bible r eading in the common schools were primarily about
control, not doctrine. The anti-Catholic attitude of the time was
primarily nativist, and sought not merely to ensure that
Protestant doctrine was taught in schools, but that the
dominant religious and ethnic groups in America remained
dominant. 358 A religious xenophobia in part made up this view;
nativists liked to spread worries of a Catholic fifth column,
undermining the republic by taking orders from the pope.
Whereas the King James Bible was everywhere associated with
political liberty, the Douay Bible was an instrument for
subjugating fre e people to the "Romish" church. 359
But the battles had ethnic and cultural dimensions as well.
Even where Irish Catholics attended common schools and
complied with the curriculum, they were subject to verbal
abuse
as
"paddies,"
and
targeted
as
reqmrmg
Americanization. 360 In a debate with nativist lawyers
r epresenting the New York Public School Society, Bishop John
Hughes of New York read from a book purportedly in the school
library, The Irish Heart , which expressed worry that Irish
immigration would make the United States into "the common
sewer of Ireland."361 Outside the school, of course,
discrimination against the Irish was widespread. Verbal abuse
was common in the streets and in the press, according to which
the Irish drank and fought, and refused to act American. 362 The
dispute between Irish Catholics and Protestants in America's
355. !d .
356. !d. at 35-37 .
357. D ELFATIORE, sup ra note 336, a t 37-38; WALCH, supra note 253, a t 48-49.
358. S ee D ELFATTORE, sup ra note 336, at 19- 21.
35 9. I d. a t 19, 22.
360. KA ESTLE, supra note 44, a t 16:3.
:3 61. I d. at 25- 26, 168.
362. See D ELFATTORE, supra note 33 6, at 19 (quoting DIANE RAVI'TCH, THE GREAT
SCHOOL W ARS 29 ( 1974)) .
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cities was thus, in large part, a battle for political recognition
and equality. If the Irish could force common schools to include
their Bible in its curriculum, it would show that they had to be
accepted in the mainstream; conversely, Protestants were
determined to keep the Bible out and the Irish marginalized. 363
2. Public funding and Catholic schools
Apart from their struggles with the common schools,
Catholics had also long maintained their own schools. This was
difficult; Catholic immigrants were often poor and unable to
provide their schools with financial support. In some places,
tax revenues filled the gap. Catholic schools in Massachusetts,
Wisconsin and Connecticut, for example, received public funds
until the 1840s-1860s. 364 Nevertheless, many of these schools
could provide education to only a fraction of the Catholic
population. 365 In New York City, Catholic charity schools had
received tax revenue until 1825, when the then-New York Free
School Society convinced the Common Council that it should
cease funding denominational schools.366 While the primary
target was likely other Protestant denominations, like the
Baptists, whose schools were competing with those of the Free
School Society, the effects of the decision were felt by Catholics
as well. For years afterwards, many Catholic schools suffered
from extremely limited capacity and operated in church
basements. 367 The situation generated another well-known
conflict in the history of Catholic education.
In 1841, Bishop Hughes, petitioned the New York City
Common Council in request of public funds for Catholic
schools. 368 He argued that Catholics, like Protestants, paid
taxes, and should enjoy tax support for their schools. It was no
answer that Catholic schools were sectarian, since the Public
School Society common schools were sectarian as well, and
functioned to impart Protestant beliefs and morals. If the
Common Council continued to deny funds to Catholic schools
based on sectarianism, he said, it should deny funds to the

363.
364.
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common schools, as wel1. 369 The argument infuriated the Public
School Society, many of whose members were nativists, and
rubbed raw the tensions in the city between immigrants and
natives. After a raucous and vitriolic two-day debate on
Hughes's petition, between Hughes and nativist lawyers, the
Common Council denied funds on the grounds that the Catholic
schools were sectarian. 370 Hughes then turned to the state
legislature, which, after several sessions, in 1842 took control
over state education funds from the Public School Society-a
voluntary association-and placed that control in the hands of
popularly elected local school boards, some of which would be
nominated by Catholics.J7 1
Elsewhere, the effort to support Catholic schools met with
more success. In 1831, residents of Lowell, Massachusetts
appropriated fifty dollars to establish a "separate school for the
benefit of the Irish population." 372 Residents at the town
meeting felt that it made sense to provide denominational
education for the growing Catholic population for the same
reasons that they provided tax support for Protestant
education in local schools. The town committee planned to
jointly administer the school with religious leadership, as it did
in the Protestant schools. 373 Under the terms of their
agreement, the school committee reserved the right to examine
and appoint school teachers, prescribe textbooks and
curriculum, and to "examine, inspect and supervise" the
school. 374 For their part, parish priests required that the board
appoint only "qualified Catholics" to teaching positions, and
that textbooks contain no anti-Catholic statements. Parishes
provided the school buildings, and the school committee paid
teachers. The system was a success; by 1835, Lowell had three
tax-funded Catholic schools enrolling, together, almost 4,000
students. The agreement ended in 1852 when one Catholic
parish invited the Sisters of Notre Dame to staff its school. The
Lowell school committee refused to pay their salaries. Despite
the unhappy conclusion, the Lowell plan gained renown and
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was copied in other communities. 375
In places where the Catholic population was greater,
communities were better able to establish and maintain
independent schools. The German Catholic population of the
Midwest is perhaps the best example. As discussed above,
German Catholics composed a large part of Wisconsin's
population in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Wisconsin needed these settlers; unlike eastern states, it had to
"recruit" immigrants inland with "cultural concessions."376
Moreover, immigrants who could afford to travel inland often
had greater resources and were therefore better able to fund
independent schools. 377 Moreover, Germans in particular
manifested a strong interest in establishing schools. Both
German Lutherans and German Catholics saw schooling as the
means for preserving their traditions and religion for future
generations. 378 This view also affected public schooling in the
Midwest. German Catholics and Lutherans used their political
and economic leverage to encourage the hiring of German
teachers and instruction either in both English and German, or
German alone. 379

B. Legal Challenges and Catholic Parental Rights
Early contests between Catholics and Protestants over
schooling were primarily political. 380 In the case of New York
City, the conflict involved the emergence of the Irish as a
formidable political force, and was largely confined to op-eds,
letters, debates, and finally, the ballot box.38 1 In Philadelphia,
of course, the conflict took to the streets. Yet in most cases, the
logic of these early disputes was "majority rule." 382 Protestants
regarded the common school curriculum as inoffensive and
non-sectarian. Reading from the King James Bible, singing
hymns, and reciting the Ten Commandments was simply how
most Americans educated their children. 383
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In contrast, the conflict over Wisconsin's compulsory
attendance statute took on a legal dimension, as well. Most
states did not enact such statutes until the early twentieth
century, but, in heavily German Wisconsin, the state
legislature passed one as early as 1890. 384 Known as the
"Bennett Law," it required children between ages seven and
fourteen to attend a school in their district, prescribed a
curriculum, required teaching in the English language, and set
criminal fines for non-compliance. 385 The legislation effectively
prevented many parents from sending their children to
religious schools, since they were often located outside the
district where the family lived. The mandate requiring
instruction in English also undercut efforts by Lutherans and
Catholics to maintain their heritage .386
Catholics and Lutherans protested such regulations
vociferously. In Milwaukee, they were successful in replacing
the Republican Mayor with a Democratic candidate who ran
primarily against the law.387 Two years later, the Republican
Governor who supported the Bennett Law also lost his seat,
and a new slate of state legislators repealed the law.388 In this
respect, the dispute in Wisconsin resembled the dispute in New
York City; religious groups opposed to the Protestantdominated common schools used the political process to effect
change. Notably, in Wisconsin, Catholics allied themselves
with Protestant Lutherans to protect their rights to maintain
independent "sectarian" religious schools. In New York,
Catholics had struggled to obtain public financing without the
assistance of allies. But, in another respect, the incidents were
very different. In his attack on the funding of the New York
common schools, Bishop Hughes had focused in large part on
the anti-Catholic character of the curriculum. 389 His aim was in
part to show that the education in the common schools were
sectarian, and convince the Common Council that, out of
fairness , it should fund the sectarian Catholic schools as
well. 390 In contrast, the arguments of the Catholic leadership in
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Wisconsin during the Bennett Law conflict focused on parental
rights. 391 In their 1890 "Sapientiae Christianae," the three
Catholic bishops of Wisconsin argued that "theirs was not a
mere political protest, since the Bennett Law violated rights of
parent and church in education .... [The law] was 'unjust'
because it interfered with the 'sacred, inalienable rights of
parents' in education." 392
As the Wisconsin bishops presented it, the parental right to
educate one's children was itself a form of religious liberty. The
bishops understood-as Catholic leadership elsewhere in the
country also had-that Catholic education was central to the
survival of the church in America. 393 Catholic schooling would
produce Catholic adults. Because religious inculcation was the
primary means of ensuring the well being and future of the
church, a parent who chose to educate her child in a religious
school was herself engaging in religious conduct. 394 It was
conduct, moreover, that received sanction from church
leadership at the highest level. 395 In 1884, American bishops at
the Third Plenary Council had stated that all Catholic parents
were "bound" to send their children to Catholic school. 396
Shortly afterwards, in January 1890, Pope Leo XIII issued an
encyclical stating that the church was "absolutely oppose[d]" to
the enrollment of children in the "impious" schools. Parents,

391. Hunt, supra note 231 at 71-73, 76.
392. ld. at 73 (quoting HARRY T. HEMING, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WISCONSIN
283-86 (1896)).
393. Id. at 85 (1981); see also WALCH, supra note 253, at 40 ("[T]he clergy persisted
in establishing parish schools no matter what the cost because the very existence of the
church in America depended on these institutions to protect future generations.").
394. See Hunt, supra note 231, at 73 (noting that the parental obligation to provide
a Catholic education stemmed from dvine law).
395. This is a crucial point. Contrary to Noah Feldman's claim, when Catholic
parents claimed that being forced to send their children to public schools violated their
parental rights, they were not always making an argu ment that derived entirely from
the Protestant notion of "liberty of conscience." See DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at
65. While some Catholics did claim that mandatory attendance laws violated their
liberty of conscience (a Protestant notion), others instead claimed that such laws
required them to violate definitive pronouncements fro m the Catholic hierarchy that
Catholics must send their children to Catholic schools. The so urce of t he "right" in the
latter case was not the protection afforded the liberty of conscience, but the protection
afforded reli gious conduct in general. See Hunt, supra note 231 , at 73.
396. Thomas C. Hunt & Norlene M. Kunkel , Catholic Schools: The Nation's
Largest Alternative School System, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 1, 6 (James C.
Harper & Thomas C. Hunt, eds., 1984) (quoting the Instruction of the Congregation of
Propaganda de Fide, in CATHOLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
92 (Neil G. McCluskey ed., 1964)).

2]

327

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND STATE REGULATION

"by God-given right, have the duty to educate their children in
accordance with the 'principles of Christian morality."' 397
Writing the same year, the Wisconsin bishops repeated that
the right to control education had its source in "natural and
divine law," and urged that the state of Wisconsin had no
"right" to compel students to attend the common schools. 398 Nor
was this claim limited to Catholic leadership. Catholic
newspapers repeatedly asserted that the Bennett Law
infringed parental rights. 39 9
Although the Bennett Law crisis was resolved politically,
the assertion that compulsory attendance violated a religious
right of parents to educate their children was an important
development. In part, this fueled old fears that Catholics would
take orders from Rome and undermine the country. But the
rights claim was also being made elsewhere, and in some cases
it evidenced an increasing sensitivity to the sectarianism of the
public schools and the legitimacy of Catholic objections. 40 For
example, as early as 1876, Presbyterian minister Samuel
Thayer Spear argued that Protestants urging prayer in schools
"substantially ask for themselves in respect to the public schools
what they deny Catholics."

°

"King James's version is all very well for them ," Spear wrote,
"since they are agreed in accepting it; but it is not so for these
other parties, who are taxed in common with them for the
support of public schools, and who under our theory of
government have just as many and just as sacred rights as
they have in these schools." 401

This transformation was felt primarily in state courts,
where in the late nineteenth century suits over the King James
Bible began to have success. 402
One early case was Board of Education v. Minor, in which
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a decision by a lower court
striking a board of education policy that prohibited religious
instruction and Bible reading in Cincinnati common schools. 403
397. Hunt, supra note 231 , at 72.
398. Id. a t 73.
399. ld. a t 71.
400. See DELFATTORE, supra note 336at 52-54.
401. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 52-53 (quoting THAYER SPEAR, RELIGION AND
THE STATE 41 (1876)).
402. Id. ; see also Thomas C. Hunt, The Edgerton Bible Decision: The End of an
Era, 67 CATH. HIST. REV. 589 (1981); TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 163.
403 . Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 , 243 (1872).
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The dispute before the court had begun much like those in New
York and Philadelphia thirty years earlier: Catholic leaders
requested public funds for Catholic schools. When the
Cincinnati Board of Education responded that it would not
fund sectarian education, Catholics retorted that a common
school curriculum including the King James Bible was also
sectarian. Unlike the New York dispute, however, Cincinnati
Catholics were accompanied in their resistance by other
religious minorities, and the Board of Education, unlike the
New York Public School Society and New York Common
Council, was sensitive to the unfairness of funding Protestant
education alone. 404 In response to the request, the Board of
Education passed a resolution prohibiting religious instruction
and the reading of religious books, "including the Holy Bible,"
in city schools. 405
Protestants sued. They argued that a clause in the Ohio
Constitution declaring "religion, morality and knowledge" to be
essential to good government required that Ohio schools
provide religious instruction. 406 In an opinion by Justice Welch,
the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument. It found that
the constitution did not specify what religious or moral truths
had to be taught, and thus left this to legislative
determination, as it did the duty to provide for such an
education. 407 This point resolved the case. Nevertheless, the
court continued at length, doing so in order to dispel the threat
posed by the dispute to the "harmonious working of the state
government." 408 It is true, the court supposed, that the best
religion is essential to the best government. But how should
the best religion be secured?
I answer, it can best be secured by adopting the doctrine of
this 7th section in our own bill of rights, and which I
summarize in two words, by calling it the doctrine of 'hands
off.' . . . It is the true republican doctrine. It is simple and
easily understood. It means a free conflict of opinions as to
things divine; and it means masterly inactivity on the part of
the state, except for the purpose of keeping the conflict free,
and preventing the violation of private rights or of the public

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

DELFATTORE, supra note 336, a t 56.
Id. a t 57 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 2 11 , 211 (Ohio 18 72).
Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 243.
ld. at 244, 245.
ld. at 245.
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peace .. . . It means that a man's right to his own religious
convictions, and to impart them to his own children, and his
and their right to engage, in conformity thereto, in harmless
acts of worship toward the Almighty, are as sacred in the eye
of the law as his rights of person or property, and that
although in the minority, he shall be protected in the full and
unrestricted enjoyment thereo£. 409

A number of things are remarkable about this unusual
opinion, but two are important here. First, though dicta,
Justice Welch clearly recognizes a parental free exercise right
against interference with religious education. Unlike the right
asserted in the case of the Bennett Law, this right has a basis
in the Ohio Constitution and presumably affords a remedy to
unlawful state regulation. 410 This view gives a legal dimension
to conflicts between the state and religious schools, which
church leadership had previously sought to solve through
political means. Moreover, while in the twentieth century Bible
reading in public schools has been found to violate the
Establishment Clause, the Ohio Supreme Court in 1872
appears to regard it as implicating both establishment-like and
free exercise-like rights. 411
Second, Justice Welch's comments have a Jeffersonian feel
to them. Jefferson believed that state-administered free
schooling and religious liberty went hand-in-hand. 412 In this
respect, he differed from most common school reformers in the
1830s and 1840s, who understood the inculcation of Protestant
morals to be an important goal of common schooling. A similar
concern for the importance of religion to the republic led
Justice Welch to a conclusion much closer to Jefferson's than
Horace Mann's. In Welch's view, to arrive at the "best religion,"
one should enable "a free conflict of opinions as to things
divine ," instead of inculcating one doctrine at the expense of
another. 413 This government is best served by a school that
prepares students to choose freely between religions on the
open market. 414

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id. at 250-51.
ld. at 245.
Id . at 250-51.
S ee supra note 280.
See Minor, 23 Ohio St. a t 250-5 1.
See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Introduction to this article makes two claims about the
history of American education. First, it asserts that the history
of education shows that parents have long ceded control to the
state in regulating the education-even the religious
education-of children. 415 Second, it asserts that the history of
education is problematic for proponents of what I called
"equality theories" and "liberty theories" of the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses. 416 I would now like to return to
these points and argue that the history discussed above has
borne out the claims of the Introduction. I begin with the
second point.
A. Equality Theories and Liberty Theories
An equality theory of the First Amendment argues that the
purpose of the Religion Clauses is to protect political equality,
in particular, to protect members of minority religions from
members of majority religions. In contrast, according to a
liberty theory of the First Amendment, the purpose of the
Religion Clauses is to protect liberty of conscience. What
relevance does the history of educational practices have for
either theory of religious liberty?

1. The problem: the republican character of early education
One feature of each of the historical periods discussed
above-colonization, founding, and antebellum-is that state
interests in schooling were asserted in response to the
perceived threat of instability or collapse. The earliest colonists
in Massachusetts Bay faced the threat of collapse quite
literally, and in response, the colonial government asserted
new powers over educational practices that had hitherto taken
place, for the most part, inside the home. 417 Two hundred years
later, the founders were themselves occupied with the prospect
of collapse of the new federal government. They sought to
introduce a common school system, in part to homogenize the
citizenry and to instill a sense of public virtue, both of which
415. See supra Part LA.
416. See supra Part LB.
417. See supra Part ILA. (discussing the changes in education that arose when
settlers arrived in America).
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they believed were necessary for the survival of so large a
republic. 418 Finally, the common school reformers responded to
the rapid influx of diverse immigrants and the city instability
with a proposed common school system, which would
Americanize immigrant Catholics by instructing them in core
Protestant morals. 419 In all three cases, reformers believed
that, through formal education, the state could shape
individuals and thereby avoid collapse.
In both the founding and antebellum periods, proponents of
universal education sought to offer moral education in the
schools. As they saw it, only moral instruction could shape
individual conduct in the ways necessary to avoid instability or
collapse; thus, moral education was necessary for formal
education to achieve its purpose. 420 What "moral" education
entailed, however, underwent a transformation. During the
common school movement, moral instruction took on a more
overtly doctrinal connotation, as reformers focused on the
children of Catholic immigrants. 421 Setting this difference
aside, formal schooling in both periods was clearly designed to
exert moral influence over individuals-to shape and to fashion
their core beliefs and conduct-not to respect differences and
leave them untouched. 422 This is what I have referred to as the
republican nature of early American education. 423
On its face, this aspect of early education is at odds with the

418. See supra Part Il.B.l. & 2. (discussing concerns that citizens in a republic
would not obey the laws, and th at a la rge republic would not be homogenous enough to
survive).
41 9. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 163; see supra Part III.B.l. & 2.
420. See DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 60 (describing this reasoning in the
case of the common school movement). The same r easoning was evident elsewhere. See,
e.g., WOOD, supra note 105, at 120 (describing the view of the found ers th at education
promoted virtue, which was necessary for republican government).
421. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 140 (describing Mann's
view of the appropriate common school curriculum as close to the "evangelical
conce ptions of the day"). Compare this description to the views of the founders about
the significance of formal ed ucation, which appear much more civic in nature. See Part
II.B. (describing these views).
422. For an example of this attitude in the founding period, see supra note 108 and
accompanying text. The church charity schools provide another powerful example,
there designed to prevent children from remaining impoverished. See Part II.C. The
attitude was widespread in the era of common school reform.
423. For discussion of the meaning of "republican" as used here, see supra note 82;
see supra Part II.B.l. & 2. On this account, r epublicanism emphasized the public good
and the necessity of individual virtue for government by the people, in contrast to an
emphasis on individual rights against the majority. See, e.g. , WOOD, supra note 105, at
53-54, 61, 65-66.
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assertion that we have long protected the liberty of conscience
or the equality of members of minority religions, and that this
should form the basis of our interpretation of the Religion
Clauses. 424 How could a liberty or equality theorist more fully
account for the religious character of our educational practices?
What changes might the history of education require in s~ch
theories?

2. Response one: the common schools were non-sectarian
One possible response is that no changes are required. For
example, a liberty theorist could argue that the common
schools only functioned to impose on children the morals held
in common by most members of society. While early school
administrators drew on Protestant sources for those morals,
this derivation does not, on its own, make them Protestant.
They might have been derived from other sources as well. After
all, how "sectarian" are the values of hard work, self-control,
modesty, honesty, frugality, and respect for private property
and traditional family roles-all emphasized by early
curricular materials?425 Horace Mann made this "nonsectarian" argument in support of the common schools in
response to objections from members of minority Protestant
denominations. 426 Noah Feldman has recently taken a similar
position, suggesting that the republican character of the
common school curriculum-its nativist and anti-Catholic
aspects-emerged only after immigrant Catholics began to
object to the use of the King James Bible. 427 We can call this
response the "non-sectarian" response, since it emphasizes the
shared, non-sectarian character of religious education in the
common schools. 428
The non-sectarian response is unsatisfying for several
reasons. First, it is in tension with much of the available
historical scholarship, which suggests-contrary to Feldman's

424. NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 2-5; DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 27 .
425. See HOWE, supra note 54, at 453 (notin g the argument that "the common
school embodied a comm on ideology"); KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 80- 83.
426. DIVIDED BY GoD, supra note 55, at 61-62.
427. Id. at 64-65.
428. The response is not limited to the liberty theorist ; the same a rgu m ent
supports the equality theorist as well. For if a "non-sectarian" curriculum sufficed to
pro tect th e conscience of minority believers, it would ipso facto be unlikely to promote
majority believers at the expense of minority believers.
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view-that the Protestant curricula of the common schools was
laced with anti-Catholicism from the beginning. 429 In Kaestle's
interpretation, the superiority of Protestantism to other
denominations was intrinsic to the Protestant world view of the
school reformers of the early nineteenth century. 430 In other
words, anti-Catholicism was not a later addition to the selfunderstanding of Protestant reformers. On the contrary, along
with the millennialism fashionable at the time, the sense of
Protestant superiority accounted for much of the fervor with
which Protestants organized in support of charity schools and
then common schools. 431 Feldman and other proponents of the
non-sectarian response therefore must do more to provide it
with an adequate historical foundation.
Second, the non-sectarian response is internally
inconsistent. To see how, consider how Horace Mann and other
reformers used the "non-sectarian" argument. Mann used this
argument to encourage members of minority Protestant
denominations to support a common school system with a "panProtestant" curriculum. 432 We must assume that Protestants
who gave their support saw a need for universal, systematic
instruction in non-sectarian Protestant morals. But this raises
an important question. What need could there have been for
such instruction, if the morals it imparted were already
universally shared by the population? Such a system could
affect no moral change, since the children it taught would have
been instructed in the same morals by their parents. Such a
system would have been regarded by the public of Mann's time
as woefully inadequate. That public was anxious about the rise
of immigration in the cities and believed formal schooling
should address it. 433 If Mann's common schools offered only an
innocuous, truly universal education, there would have been no
reason for the public to support them.
429. See, e.g., KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 92-93; see supra Part III.B. and the
sources cited therein.
430. See id. at 92-93 ("English Protestants ha d considered themselves the
defender s of t he fai t h ever since their split with Rome, and the American Puritans, in
turn , believed that they had salvaged what was best in English Protestanti sm . . . .
They associated Protestant Christianity with r epublicanism, with economic pr ogress,
and with virtue . . .. The tendency of the Roman Catholic religion, in contra st, 'wa s
toward degeneracy a nd ruin' .... ").
431. See id.
432. See, e.g. , DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 61- 62.
433. See KA ESTLE, supra note 44, at 63, 69 (describing the growth of cities and the
anxiety it tri ggered) .
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3. Response two: early education was viewed differently than the
practice of religion
How else, then, might a liberty or equality theorist account
for the religious character of our educational practices? The
most obvious way to preserve the liberty and equality theories
in light of the history of education is to narrow their scope. For
example, a liberty theorist could argue that, while a republican
attitude towards religious differences prevailed in school, a
very different attitude prevailed in political society at large.
There is some support for this view. First, primary and
secondary schools educate people who have not yet reached the
age of political majority, and therefore may not enjoy full
religious liberties.434 Second, the Religion Clauses protect
individuals from government action, not from private
conduct. 435 Similarly, liberty of conscience and political
equality are political ideals, not norms of private conduct.
Early schools arguably belonged to the sphere of private
conduct, as an extension of the activities of the family and the
church. 436
While this response is somewhat attractive, fully
substantiating it would require scholarly work beyond that any
liberty or equality theorist has offered to date. For example,
proponents would have to show what attitudes prevailed about
the public or private character of school at the time of the
founding and at the time of the common school movement.
Moreover, the history discussed above suggests that American
leaders were long aware of the vital political significance of
schools. One could interpret Jefferson, Rush and Mann's state
school plans as plans to transform schools into a part of
political society, or argue that, properly understood, schools
were already a crucial part of political society. 437 If that is
correct, then why a different attitude towards religious liberty
should be taken in the schools than in other areas of political
434. But see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243-44 (Douglas, J. , dissenting).
435. See, e.g. , 16A AM. J UR. 2D Constitutional Law§ 408.
436. See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of this point.
437. See WOOD, supra n ote 105, at 120 (noting the central role some founders
attributed to education in preserving republican government) . As the discussion in Part
II.B. makes clear, the founders regarded education as vitally important to the survival
of the republic; as such, they could reasonably be viewed as a branch of government.
See also TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 43- 76 (discussing the rise of state
regulation of schooling and characterizing education as the fourth branch of state
government).
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life is unclear.
4. Response three: we have sometimes subordinated religious
liberty to other values
A third response to the history of education is also possible.
This response is that liberty of conscience and political equality
are not overriding or absolute values. While we have long
valued the liberty of conscience, and the political equality of
members of different religions, we have also long subordinated
these values to others, when the facts of a particular situation
suggest it is necessary. As the common school movement
shows, we have impinged on the liberty of conscience and
individuals' genuinely held religious beliefs, and we have
expressed preference for certain faiths over others. We do not
have to regard all these cases as failures, although in some
cases we clearly failed to act as we should have acted. In other
cases, we simply judged that other values were more
important. If this is correct, then neither the liberty theory nor
the equality theory fully explains our practices, since those
practices are more complex than either theory admits.
B. Weighing Parental and State Interests in Education
We can begin to reflect on what the history of education
reveals about parental interests by reviewing the wide variety
of interests that have appeared. Educational practices in the
early republic-predominantly, the district system-gave
parents and local school committees tremendous discretion. Yet
this discretion is best understood as something short of legal
authority, for it was not often politically challenged and was
not often conceived as legally actionable.438 Parental discretion
under the district system was, in effect, the de facto control of a
very modest, heavily instrumental undertaking: learning to
read from the Bible, learning to sign one's name, and learning
basic rules of arithmetic. This was all most rural Americans
wanted, and this is all they demanded of schools. Where early
school reform failed, as it did in Pennsylvania and in Virginia,
it was not because reformers met a parentry jealously guarding

438. There was very little litigation over education in the early r epublic. TYACK,
J AMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , a t 64---65. The first major parent-school disputes over
control that end ed up in court typically centered on school discipline, not religion. See
KAESTLE, sup ra note 44 , at 160-61.
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its "rights," but because no need was seen to fund a free stateadministered school system, and because Americans were
inherently suspicious of state taxation and regulation. 439 Thus
while it should not be overlooked that in the early district
system, parents possessed almost full control over schools, this
fact does not evidence a long-standing assertion by parents
that they had such control by right. 440
The first well-defined parental interests emerge later, in
the political conflicts over educational reform during the
common school movement. The church charity schools, from
which the common schools sprung in the cities, were designed
precisely to interfere with parent-child relationships by
engaging in religious and moral instruction. In the view of the
societies that ran them, such interference was necessary to
prevent an impoverished parent from transmitting his bad
character-and thus, his poverty-to the next generation. 441
Some common school reformers took a similar attitude towards
the children of immigrants. 442 This later precipitated a political
struggle between immigrant parents and the common schools
over the content of instruction. Still, for most of the 19th
century, the warring interests were political. Neither reformers
nor parents immediately sought to ground their position in
state or federal constitutions; instead, they resolved disputes at
the ballot box, where majority ruled. 443 In New York City, this
meant that the Protestants came out on top; in Wisconsin, the
German Catholics and Lutherans prevailed. Because the
process was political, the nature of the parental interest during
this time was importantly limited: it was subject to, and
confined by, the democratic process.
The assertion of a proper parental right to religiously
educate one's child emerged only near the end of the struggle
over common schools, and was at first not well-defined. During
the Bennett Law controversy, church authorities located the
source for parental rights in divine law, in particular, in the
439. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9; THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at
108 (describing the opponents to early reform plans).
440. See also Garvin Cty, 103 P. at 579 (noting that state regulations can narrow
the common-law right of parents to control the education of children). There was
relatively little constitutional litigation about parental rights until the twentieth
centurty. See supra note 41.
441. See supra Part II. C.
442. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 163; see supra Part III. B.
443. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 162.

2]

PARENTAL RIGHTS AND STATE REGULATION

337

duty God gave parents to ensure that their children were
instructed in Catholicism. 444 Since the survival of Catholicism
depended on this education, the right asserted was essentially
a right to a particular kind of religious conduct. 445 But not all
assertions of a parental right took this form. Some assertions of
parental rights were based on the common-law right of parents
to direct the upbringing of their children, 446 which the state
could not arbitrarily impinge. 447 A variety of parental interests
were at play.
State interests in education also took a variety of forms,
shaped by the various local and state educational practices. For
example, several notable founders took an aggressive view of
state interests in free schooling. They believed a strong
primary education was necessary to the survival of republican
government, to ensure the obedience of the people, good
leadership, and the mutual understanding of citizens. 448 For
the most part, however, reform-minded founders were unable
to achieve the school reform they hoped for. 449 Formal
schooling in the early republic remained, for the most part, a
local undertaking, although it was funded by a combination of
tuition, donations, and public monies. 45 Comprehensive reform
and state regulation of schools came later, during the common
school movement of the nineteenth century.
It is this period that is most crucial to understanding the
significance of state regulation of education. Common school
reforms reflected a genuine recognition of the importance of
universal school attendance, a standardized curriculum, the
use of qualified teachers, and adequate funding. 451 Changes in
these areas had instrumental value, if nothing else; they

°

444. Hunt, sup ra note 23 1, at 73.
445. See id. ; Prince, 321 U.S. at 164 (acknowledging this characterization).
446. See O'Hara, supra note 16, a t 5, 5 n.1 (citing Garvin Cty, 103 P. at 578).
447. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. As another variation, the appellant in Prince argued
in the alternative that the state's regulation r estricted her child's right to practice
r eligion. Prince, 321 U.S. at 164 ("Thus, two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the
parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go, which for the appellant means
to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith. The other freedom is the child's,
to observe these .... ").
448. See supra P a rt II. B.
449. See sup ra Part II.B. (describing the rejection of reform plans in Virginia and
Pennsylvania).
450. See supra notes 190, 193 and accompanying text.
451. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 106 (detailing the defects of the previous
di strict system domina nt in the North).
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improved the quality of schooling for pupils. 452 Yet this is , at
best, only a partial picture of the school reform movement. The
movement reflected the influence of other concerns as well. 453
Viewed from one angle, these concerns centered around a
concern to ensure social and political stability in the face of
rapid demographic and economic changes. 454 Viewed from
another angle, however, the concerns were less innocuous.
Indeed, they were invidious: reformers sought to replace
Catholicism with Protestantism, a religion they regarded as
naturally superior,455 and to Americanize newly arrived
immigrants, particularly the Irish. 456 While the difference
between these concerns is easy to mark conceptually, it is often
hard to mark practically. Indeed, it seems likely that many
common school reformers were moved by both innocuous and
invidious concerns. 4 57
This history suggests several legal conclusions. First, it is
inaccurate to juxtapose "traditional" parental rights with
"newfound" state powers. 458 In terms of the history of
education,
parents have
only
recently asserted
a
constitutionally significant "right" against the state power to
regulate the education of their children, and they have long
ceded some control over education to the state-including
control over religious education. This suggests that it may be a
mistake to apply a strict scruinty standard to state regulations
burdening parental rights. 459 In the First Amendment Free
Speech context, courts do not apply strict scrutiny where
speech has historically been unprotected. 460 More significantly,
in the Free Exercise context, courts apply rational basis review
452. Id. at 135 ("Normal schools, education journals, professional supervision,
uniform textbooks, higher teacher wages, and other antebellum r eforms were designed
to bring a mesure of consistency and quality to a collection of local institutions that the
reformers considered uneven and largely inadequate.").
453. See generally id. at chp 5.
454. See id. at 69.
455. See id. at 92-93.
456. See supra note 360 and accompanying text.
457. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 75 (describing the reform e rs).
458. See Yoder, 402 U .S. at 213-1 4.
459. See id. at 215 (explaining the level of scrutiny).
460. For example, consider regulations of the so-called "major" and "minor"
"juris dictions of censorship" under the Free Speech Clause, such as incitement or
obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (obscenity) ; Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement). The "major" and "minor" "jurisdictions of
censorship" terminology comes from HARRY KALVEN , JR., A WORTHY TRADITION:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988).
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to challenges of facially neutral, generally applicable laws; the
only exception is a "hybrid" claim, such as one resting on both
Free Exercise and parental rights. 461 However, given what we
now know about parental rights, the application of strict
scrutiny to hybrid claims makes little sense. Parental
educational rights have long been subject to state interference.
For many years, it was irrelevant whether religious eduation
was at issue. "Hybridization" did not matter. 462 Moreover,
where the Supreme Court has struck down a regulation purely
because it infringed parental rights, it has done so because the
regulation was unreasonable or the end not "within the
competency of the state."463 Why should two rights (Free
Exercise and parental rights), both of which the state may
infringe if it can satisfy rational basis review, suddenly require
strict scrutiny when combined?
Some form of heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in
light of the multiple interests at stake. Some form of
heightened scruinty may also be necessary at the balancing
stage of a claim that the state violated a parent's right to direct
her child's religious education. This is because of the problem
discussed above, namely, that historically the interests
asserted by the state in regulating education have had a janusfaced character to them. Heightened scrutiny may be necessary
to determine whether the state action in question is innocuous
or invidious. This would presumably require some examination
of the record. Under rational basis review, however, a
hypothetical legitimate state interest would suffice to satisfy a
constitutional challenge. The history of state regulation of
education suggests that courts should require something more.

461. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (discussing Yoder).
462. Nota bly, the Supreme Court stated in Prince th at a parental right claim
(based in due process) "extends no further than that to freedom of religion, since in the
circumstances all that is comprehended in the former is included in the latter." Prince,
321 U.S. at 164 n.8.
463. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (applying the rule that "rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.

